MEMPHIS TN (IFS) -- During the interview with Ambassador Carolyn Kennedy a couple of night ago with CBS News Nora O'Donnell, when asked if Japan would help defend the United States in a time of a war, the silence alone was defonding, as Ambassador Kennedy struggled to find an answer to that question.
It was very apparent that Japan would not left one finger to help the US against anyone, and that they still have a big grudge with the United States of America.
So doing so research I put up several likely reasons that the people of Japan may not want to help us, but we still have to help them. . . -KHS
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Why are the people who live in Japan angry with the USA over something that happened 67 years ago? Japan started the war so why are they angry we ended it on the USA terms?
Best Answer: Japan doesn't believe they started the war and doesn't teach they did in schools. Instead they teach that they were minding their own business and we attacked them first. The rest of the war and the way we ended it then are just ways we "added insult to injury".
Japan of course had been an isolationist for many years before finally deciding to follow the footsteps of many European countries and started trying to colonize (for both more room and more resources). They attacked many of the countries around them including China and Russia (winning both battles) and were making their way around the islands of the Pacific (as much as anything else to get resources needed to continue their war against China and eventually Russia). The U.S. went over there to defend the freedom of these independent islands (both for their well being and for ours) and Japan tried to roll right over us, initially having a little success.
They then of course attacked Pearl Harbor to try to eliminate any other obstacles to their aggression and were monumentally successful due as much to the many stupid mistakes we made in defending the island (most of which were caused by our opinion that Japan would never attack us directly) as their own careful and deliberate planning.
Getting on to your actual question, what we did (necessary or not) was horrible of course - we intentionally attacked civilians and wiped out two cities to make a point. Had they not surrendered when they did, we likely would have attacked a more heavily populated town. Many believe that this was not necessary as the war was "about to end anyway". The conventional thinking at the time though was that we needed to have a catastrophic blow against Japan of some kind to get them to agree to surrender, which because of their pride, they may have been unlikely to do even with a prolonged period of defeats and the alternative to nuclear attack (to assure a quick resolution) would have been an invasion of Tokyo which would have taken exponentially more lives including both ours and theirs.
I have met alot of people from the war, and even have had relatives who served, who were captured by the Japanese and tortured so violently by them that they never recovered (they either suffered terrible physical trauma, or mental trauma that crippled them for the rest of their lives) and not one of them have ever received an apology (or even an admission of guilt) for any of the things the Japanese did to them, many of which were so horribly terrific and disgusting I won't even write down here. However we have officially apologized for ending a war we didn't start in such a way that caused alot of death and destruction, but probably saved alot more death and destruction were we to carry out the necessary battles to win the war in the conventional way. That doesn't make what we did to them right, but it does make their complaints seem more hypocritical and unbelievable,
I don't think there is such a thing as someone who is 100% right and someone else who is 100% wrong in any conflict. Alot of different things led up to the start and the end of the war and nobody came through it smelling like roses. But when someone (a country in this case) does something they know is wrong (tries to forcibly take over every country within a 1000 miles of them and then ravishes those countries resources and enslaves their people for the war effort) they shouldn't whine about what happens to them when they fail.
We do alot of stupid things too in the world, but after every conflict we have ever had abroad, we have gone back and rebuilt those countries and pumped money into their economies and fought for them to have freedoms greater than they ever imagined before (Japan was an Imperial dictatorship before the war). I am not certain, but I don't believe Japan has ever given us one single Yen for the death and destruction they caused in Hawaii, or Guam, or given anyone else in the pacific any money to rebuild after the destruction caused by their violent and unprovoked attacks.
The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50
Still a Grand Bargain?
By George R. Packard
From our March/April 2010 Issue
On January 19, 1960, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter signed a historic treaty. It committed the United States to help defend Japan if Japan came under attack, and it provided bases and ports for U.S. armed forces in Japan. The agreement has endured through half a century of dramatic changes in world politics -- the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the rise of China -- and in spite of fierce trade disputes, exchanges of insults, and deep cultural and historical differences between the United States and Japan. This treaty has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
Given its obvious success in keeping Japan safe and the United States strong in East Asia, one might conclude that the agreement has a bright future. And one would be wrong. The landslide electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) last August, after nearly 54 years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, has raised new questions in Japan about whether the treaty's benefits still outweigh its costs.
LABOR PAINS
Back in 1952, when an earlier security treaty (which provided the basis for the 1960 treaty) entered into force, both sides thought it was a grand bargain. Japan would recover its independence, gain security at a low cost from the most powerful nation in the region, and win access to the U.S. market for its products. Without the need to build a large military force, Japan would be able to devote itself to economic recovery. The United States, for its part, could project power into the western Pacific, and having troops and bases in Japan made credible both its treaty commitments to defend South Korea and Taiwan and its policy of containment of the Soviet Union and communist China.
But there was also much to be unhappy about, especially for the Japanese. This was an agreement negotiated between a victor and an occupied nation, not equal sovereign states. The Japanese government, which had never in its history accepted foreign troops on its soil, was now forced to agree to the indefinite presence of 260,000 U.S. military personnel at more than 2,800 bases across the country. Practical arrangements for the troops' stationing were left to an administrative agreement that did not require the approval of the Diet, the Japanese parliament. This gave the United States the right to quell large-scale internal disturbances in Japan. Against their better judgment, Japan's leaders were also forced to agree to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of all of China. Meanwhile, the U.S. government made no specific commitment to defend Japan and retained the freedom to use its troops anywhere in East Asia.
The United States also came to have misgivings about the terms of the alliance. Under Article 9 of Japan's 1947 constitution, which General Douglas MacArthur had forced on the country, Japan renounced "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force in settling international disputes" and undertook never to maintain "land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential." The U.S. government soon regretted this language: Japan could invoke it as an excuse to stay out the United States' future wars. Indeed, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida found ways to resist Washington's urgings to build up Japan's army. Not only had the United States undertaken to come to Japan's defense in case of an attack while Japan had no reciprocal obligation, but Japan insisted that its constitution prohibited it from exercising the right of collective self-defense and thus from ever sending troops or vessels to help Americans in combat operations.
By 1957, buoyed by the country's rising prosperity and new nationalism, the postwar generation of Japanese college students, Marxist intellectuals, and labor unionists, among others, started to chafe at the inequalities embedded in the treaty. The U.S. troops living on bases in Japan had brought crime and caused accidents; the agreement still risked dragging Japan into war with China or North Korea or the Soviet Union. Kishi staked his political life on improving the agreement's terms for Japan. After three years of hard bargaining, a revised treaty, which could be abrogated after ten years, was hammered out. The U.S. government committed to defending Japan if it was attacked. It agreed to consult Japan in advance of any major changes in the deployment of its troops or equipment or in its use of its bases in Japan for combat operations.
Although the revised treaty improved Japan's leverage, Japanese left-wingers, among others, used the ratification process to express their disapproval of the entire U.S.-Japanese alliance system. Kishi battled his left-wing critics for months, melees broke out in the Diet, and thousands of Japanese protested in massive street demonstrations. On May 19, 1960, Kishi suddenly forced a vote to ratify the treaty in the lower house, calling on the police to remove his Socialist opponents for staging sit-downs and blocking the Speaker from calling the Diet to order. Too clever by half, the maneuver aroused even greater and more violent street protests, and a state visit by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, timed to coincide with the revised treaty's ratification, had to be canceled. The treaty was eventually approved, and it was ratified on June 23, but Kishi announced his resignation the same day. The Liberal Democratic Party, the dominant conservative party, had learned that it could not impose its will on the opposition on matters of war and peace.
The road ahead was bumpy, too. In the late 1960s, Japan was wracked by violent demonstrations opposing the United States' war in Vietnam. In 1971, angered by Japan's huge export surplus with the United States and by what he considered a betrayal by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato -- Sato had apparently promised to curb the flood of Japanese textiles into the U.S. market in exchange for the return of U.S.-controlled Okinawa to the Japanese -- President Richard Nixon delivered three blows to Japan. First, after pressuring Tokyo to support the government in Taiwan for years, Nixon, without any prior notice, sent his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to Beijing to discuss rapprochement with China. Then, again without warning, he took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard, causing the yen to surge in value and thus severely hurting Japan's export-led economy. Finally, citing the U.S. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, Nixon imposed a ten percent tax on imports from Japan. Those three actions, which are known in Japan today as "the Nixon shocks," shattered the image of the United States as Japan's benevolent protector.
The 1980s were ever more fractious. Growing concerned about continuing trade deficits, the dominance of Japanese companies in many U.S. markets, and the trade barriers that kept U.S. products out of the Japanese market, the U.S. government in 1985 forced an agreement on Japan that would limit the import of Japanese computer chips to the United States. The next year, it levied a fine on Tokyo for violating the agreement. Other countermeasures followed. On July 2, 1987, members of the U.S. Congress smashed a Toshiba radio with sledgehammers in time for the evening news to protest revelations that Toshiba had sold classified technology to the Soviets. A small group of revisionist writers spread the notion in the U.S. mainstream media that Japan was hell-bent on destroying the United States' industrial sector; according to this argument, Japan wanted to win through unfair trade practices what it could not win in World War II. By the end of the decade, wariness of Japan was intense. In a 1989 Gallup poll, 57 percent of U.S. respondents said they considered Japan to be a greater threat to the United States than the Soviet Union. It took the bursting of Japan's economic bubble and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to keep tensions between the United States and Japan from getting any worse.
When Bill Clinton came to power in 1993, he, as well as many members of his administration, had been much influenced by the notion that Japan was the enemy. But the value of the security treaty between the two countries was brought home to Washington after North Korea's testing of nuclear weapons in 1993-94 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. In a 1996 report, Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense for national security affairs, succeeded in getting a joint statement adopted that committed the United States to keeping 100,000 troops in East Asia and reaffirmed the United States' resolve to defend Japan. Still, there were misunderstandings and gaffes: President Clinton shocked the Japanese when he visited Beijing for nine days in 1998 and declared China a strategic partner, without so much as stopping for a day in either Tokyo or Seoul. New guidelines for defense cooperation were adopted in 1997-98, spelling out details about the United States' access to rear-area support in Japan and to supplies and airports in the event of an emergency. After North Korea test-fired a two-stage ballistic missile over Japan in 1998, Tokyo agreed to cooperate with Washington and share technology on anti-ballistic-missile defense.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Despite some frictions, both the United States and Japan have found that the benefits of the treaty have generally outweighed its costs. Over the years, the treaty has evolved from being a statement of intentions to being a reasonably credible operating system. Certainly, the benefits for Japan always remained clear. Falling under the U.S. nuclear umbrella freed up Tokyo to carry out the so-called Yoshida Doctrine and focus on the country's economic growth; without the need to acquire nuclear weapons, Japan could almost always hold its defense budget to less than one percent of GDP. The treaty also preserved Japan's access to the U.S. market, which served as a life vest in a sea of sometimes serious trade disputes. All of this gave Japan a chance to nurture the fragile roots of parliamentary democracy, turning them into a robust and durable system.
For the United States, the treaty's long-term benefits included having the equivalent of an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" (as Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone put it in 1983) to carry out its forward strategy in East Asia. The agreement gave the U.S. Navy a strategic advantage in observing the movements of Soviet warships and, in case of war, an easy way to bottle up the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. And Washington benefited from the comparatively low cost of basing troops in East Asia, which was especially advantageous in this case because Japan was committed to being a generous host.
Over the years, Japan has also taken a number of steps to alleviate the Pentagon's concerns that it was free-riding on the United States for its security. In 1977, it took steps toward making its equipment and communications interoperable with those of U.S. forces in the country, and it started to engage in joint planning and training exercises. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Nakasone reached an agreement under which Japan would exclude from its ban on arms exports defense technology exports to the United States. Japan has also gradually overcome its reluctance to send troops abroad. In 1992, after having sat out the Persian Gulf War, it passed legislation allowing its troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Since 1992, Japanese troops have engaged in such missions in Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Mozambique, the Palestinian territories, and Rwanda. From 2001 until mid-January this year, Japan kept naval vessels in the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan; it also committed 600 troops to Iraq (albeit in a relatively peaceful zone), and it has (if grudgingly) allowed U.S. nuclear-powered vessels to dock at Japanese ports. Japan now has the seventh-largest military budget in the world.
One issue that remains sensitive in the relationship is nuclear weapons. Because of its understandable allergy to all things nuclear, after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, since 1960 Japan has insisted that no U.S. nuclear weapon could be based on its territory. In 1967, Prime Minister Sato unilaterally declared his now famous three principles against nuclear weapons: Tokyo would not manufacture, possess, or introduce such weapons into Japan. This posed a problem for Tokyo. Could U.S. ships and planes carry nuclear weapons while in transit through Japanese ports and airports without violating that third principle? As it happens, a secret agreement signed in 1960 (and subsequently declassified in the United States) provided that they could. Still, the Japanese government continues to take the position that no such agreement exists: after all, it argues, an exchange of notes accompanying the 1960 security treaty required Washington to consult Tokyo prior to bringing any nuclear weapons into Japan, and Washington has never done so. Meanwhile, it is the policy of the U.S. government to neither confirm nor deny the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons anywhere at any time.
The new Hatoyama cabinet has appointed a high-level panel of respected outside experts to investigate whether secret agreements exist between the two governments. As of the time of this writing, the panel was close to announcing that such a deal does indeed exist -- thereby revealing that since 1960, successive Japanese governments have lied to the Japanese people. Other deals are also likely to be disclosed: deals about allowing the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Okinawa in times of emergency, about a joint-combat strategy in the event of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and about an alleged payment by Japan to the United States to cover the costs involved in the formal return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Revealing the existence of these agreements at the time they were struck would have set off political fireworks; it might even have brought down governments. Today, the Japanese public has been sufficiently well informed by its media to take the news of their existence in stride. Still, the disclosures will only add to the cost side of the ledger for Japan.
A NEW LANDSCAPE
Japan's new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, is one of the more unusual and interesting Japanese politicians since the end of World War II. The scion of a political family -- his great-grandfather was Speaker of the House of Representatives, and his grandfather was prime minister -- Hatoyama studied engineering in both Japan and the United States, earning his Ph.D. from Stanford University. He once appeared to be headed for an academic career but then entered politics, in 1986, on the Liberal Democratic Party's ticket. In 1993, he co-founded the first Democratic Party of Japan, an opposition party that later absorbed or merged with several other parties to form today's DPJ. In the general election last summer, the DPJ's main foreign policy pledges included paying more attention to Japan's neighbors and withdrawing the Japanese ships in the Indian Ocean supporting the war in Afghanistan. Although the Hatoyama cabinet has already suffered a political scandal (involving illegal campaign-funding practices), the DPJ and its allies hold sufficient votes in both houses of parliament to retain power for a full four-year term.
But the U.S. government has been slow to adapt to the new political horizon in Tokyo. Hatoyama appears to want to reduce the U.S. footprint in Japan. In November 1996, he wrote in the monthly Bungei Shunju that the security treaty should be renegotiated to eliminate the peacetime presence of U.S. troops and bases in Japan by 2010. Hatoyama's political philosophy includes a vague concept of yuai (brotherhood) among neighboring nations. And at times he has spoken of forming an East Asian community that would exclude the United States. Americans who know him are quick to assert, however, that he is not anti-American but he believes in a more equal relationship.
The size and impact of the U.S. military footprint in Japan today is almost surely going to be a bone of contention in the months and years ahead. There are still some 85 facilities housing 44,850 U.S. military personnel and 44,289 dependents. Close to 75 percent of the troops are based in Okinawa, an island a little less than one-third the size of Long Island. Their presence is a continuing aggravation to local residents. In 2008, Okinawa Prefecture alone reported 28 airplane accidents, six cases of water pollution from oil waste, 18 uncontrolled land fires, and 70 felonies. And this is to say nothing of the emergence of red-light districts near the bases. U.S. military authorities are quick to point out that the crimes committed by U.S. soldiers can happen anywhere and that they occur at the hands of U.S. troops at the same rate as among comparable cohorts. This is beside the point, however: the Japanese who read reports of such crimes are wondering if the benefits of having foreign troops in their country outweigh the costs.
One particularly galling issue for the Japanese is the matter of "host nation support," or "the sympathy budget," which amounts to between $3 billion and $4 billion per year. Back in 1978, when it was eager to head off criticism from Washington for its mounting trade surpluses, the Japanese government agreed to pay for many of the labor costs of the 25,000 Japanese working on U.S. bases. Twenty percent of those workers, it turns out, provide entertainment and food services: a recent list drawn up by the Japanese Ministry of Defense included 76 bartenders, 48 vending machine personnel, 47 golf course maintenance personnel, 25 club managers, 20 commercial artists, 9 leisure-boat operators, 6 theater directors, 5 cake decorators, 4 bowling alley clerks, 3 tour guides, and 1 animal caretaker. As one DPJ Diet member, Shu Watanabe, put it, "Why does Japan need to pay the costs for U.S. service members' entertainment on their holidays?"
HAM-HANDED DIPLOMACY
Soon after a 12-year-old Japanese schoolgirl was raped by two U.S. marines and a U.S. sailor in 1995, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry set in motion a plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The two governments worked out an implementation agreement in 2006. But rather than help resolve the problem, the deal triggered the first clash between Hatoyama and U.S. President Barack Obama.
One might have expected the two new administrations to hit it off admirably. Both Hatoyama and Obama came to power repudiating their predecessors and calling for change. For the past ten years, polls have consistently shown that more than 72 percent of Japanese view the United States favorably and that 80 percent of Americans consider Japan to be a trusted ally. Last fall, Obama's popularity in Japan exceeded 80 percent; Japanese readers have been snapping up his autobiography and collected speeches.
But both leaders have been extraordinarily ham-handed in their initial dealings. One issue involves the Futenma Marine Corps air base, in the town of Ginowan, in Okinawa, whose 80,000 residents are disturbed every few minutes by the deafening sound of U.S. aircraft taking off and landing. Under the 2006 agreement to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Japan, the Futenma base was to be relocated to the less populated Okinawan town of Nago, and some 8,000 marines and their dependents were to be transferred to Guam. The U.S. government demanded that Japan pay for a large portion of the moves' expenses. But Tokyo has repeatedly called for more time to study alternatives to the plan, and Hatoyama has said that Japan would not decide its position until May 2010.
Hatoyama is in a difficult position. His partners in the Social Democratic Party want the Futenma base out of Japan entirely and have threatened to leave the ruling coalition if the 2006 agreement is implemented. But he needs their support in the upper house, at least until July, when an election is scheduled to take place. Other opponents of the 2006 agreement argue that relocating the Futenma base to Nago could harm the coral reefs offshore and thus the future of the local tourist industry.
Okinawa is Japan's poorest prefecture; its history and culture are distinct from those of the rest of country, and its inhabitants feel like second-class citizens. They recall that Okinawa bore the brunt of the U.S. invasion of April 1945, and many believe that at the time the Japanese army forced Japanese soldiers to commit suicide en masse rather than surrender to the Americans. In a poll of Okinawan residents taken in November 2009, more than 52 percent of the respondents favored consolidating and reducing the number of U.S. bases in Japan, and more than 31 percent favored removing all the U.S. bases completely. Just under 12 percent wished to maintain the status quo, presumably because of the employment opportunities and rent that the U.S. presence provides them.
The U.S. military has largely treated Okinawa as its own fiefdom since 1945. Some 12,500 Americans died and 37,000 were wounded in the battle for the island. Until it officially reverted to Japan, in 1972, the U.S. military ran the place with a free hand, often defying the wishes of both the Japanese government and the U.S. State Department. In one incident, in 1966, the U.S. military secretly transported nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Honshu, Japan's main island, in flagrant violation of the 1960 agreement. The U.S. military also resisted Okinawa's reversion, and it continues to have a proprietary attitude about what goes on there.
Some knowledgeable observers, both American and Japanese, in government and not, believe that one good solution would be to combine the Futenma Marine air base with the U.S. Air Force base at Kadena, in an area that is less populated than Ginowan. But interservice rivalry stands in the way: the Marine Corps wants its own base. Other observers have asked, pointedly, why the U.S. Marines are in Okinawa in the first place. What threat is it that they would counter? But instead of answering such questions or addressing Hatoyama's concerns, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates showed up in Tokyo in October to demand that the 2006 agreement be implemented.
THE ROAR OF BLUNDERS
Washington should have given the new Hatoyama government more time to sort out its position on the issue of the Futenma base. More generally, the U.S. government should be celebrating the electoral victory of a strong second party in Japan as evidence that the seeds of democracy, which the U.S. government helped sow, have taken root. Doing so would mean no longer expecting Japan to meekly follow orders from the Pentagon. And it would mean recognizing the right of Japanese political parties to hold their own views on security matters. It is time for the White House and the State Department to reassert civilian control over U.S. policy toward Japan, especially over military matters. It was foolish for the Pentagon to try to bully Hatoyama just one month after he came to power into carrying out an agreement that the previous Japanese government had made with the Bush administration.
A wiser course would be to adopt what the Japanese call teishisei, "low posture." Washington and Tokyo should engage in a deliberate reconsideration of the entire range of issues raised by the security treaty. If there are strong strategic arguments for keeping the U.S. Marines in Okinawa, they should be aired publicly so that the Japanese people can decide if they are persuasive. The matter of the Futenma base is only a small part of the equation.
The U.S. government should respect Japan's desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on its territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines. It should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, which to some is redolent of nineteenth-century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be aware that, at the end of the day, Japanese voters will determine the future course of the alliance. Above all, U.S. negotiators should start with the premise that the security treaty with Japan, important as it is, is only part of a larger partnership between two of the world's greatest democracies and economies. Washington stands to gain far more by working with Tokyo on the environment, health issues, human rights, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism.
In return for the removal of some U.S. troops and bases from its territory, the Japanese government should make far larger contributions to mutual security and global peace. It should explicitly state that it has the right to engage in operations of collective self-defense. Tokyo would be foolish to establish a community of East Asian nations without U.S. participation. It needs to work with Washington in the six-party talks on how to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government should also stop protecting its uncompetitive agricultural sector and join in a free-trade agreement with the United States, an idea that has been kicking around for two decades and that the DPJ endorsed in its election manifesto.
Finally, in a grand symbolic gesture, President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama should visit Hiroshima together after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Japan next fall and should issue a resounding call to end the manufacture and spread of nuclear weapons, a cause close to the hearts of both men. Then, they should visit Pearl Harbor and declare that no such attack should ever be carried out again. Such gestures could help finally soothe the wounds of war and cement U.S.-Japanese relations for decades to come.
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Japan: Let Them Defend Themselves
Unlike nearly everyone in Japan and the rest of Asia, Americans want Japan to spend more on its military, thinking that will equalize economic competition. It won't
by James Fallows
AMERICA'S biggest delusion about Japan is that the "free ride" on defense that we give Japan is the key to the two countries' problems. If we can only make the Japanese pay for their own protection, many Americans feel, our economic difficulties will work themselves out.
Last fall, before he was nominated as Secretary of Defense, John Tower told a Japanese interviewer what he later said during his confirmation hearings: that Japan should change its Constitution if that's what it would take to start spending more on defense. In its past session the U.S. Congress passed a resolution demanding that Japan spend three percent of its gross national product on defense, as opposed to the roughly one percent it spends now (and to the seven percent the United States spends). "Our European partners spend about three percent," an aide to Representative Duncan Hunter, of California, who sponsored the resolution, said early this year. "It's entirely reasonable to expect Japan to do the same." Last year Representative Patricia Schroeder, of Colorado, recommended a "defense protection fee" on all Japanese imports, to make the connection between our protection and their prosperity as bluntly explicit as it can be: for each car the Japanese bring into America, they would have to cover some of the cost of the American ships and planes that guard Japan. Otherwise, why should the United States, with its huge deficits, keep paying to protect a country whose surpluses pile up by the day?
Discuss this article in the Global Views forum of Post & Riposte.
Behind these proposals, and the broader public grumbling about Japan's "free ride," is the idea that America's economy has been hobbled by defense spending, so in all fairness Japan's should be hobbled too. Or, to put it more pleasantly, that Japan should take up some of America's burden, so that the two economies can compete on a fairer and more equal basis. However it may be phrased, the essential idea is that Japan has been imposing on our good will for just about long enough. Who won the war, anyway? If the Japanese don t back off from their aggressive trading practices, we will have to teach them a lesson by withdrawing some of the military protection we magnanimously provide.
I think this concept has things exactly the wrong way around. The military relationship between Japan and America, "free ride" and all, is much better for each party than any alternative I've heard suggested so far. The division of labor is complicated and obviously unequal -- even if Japan is paying more and more of the cost of defending its own home territory, it has nothing like America's worldwide military costs. Still, it sounds easier to correct the imbalance, by "making" Japan pay its way, than it turns out to be when you look at the details. We can do ourselves a favor if we concentrate on our real disagreements with Japan, about trade policy, and forget about the "free ride."
Before getting into the details, let's step back to consider how much damage the defense imbalance does, and how the United States got itself in this bind. Of course the difference between the Japanese and American defense budgets is enormous, and is a significant economic problem for the United States. Some Japanese officials have recently been trying to convince people that the imbalance is not as large as it seems. After all, they point out, Japan is now overtaking Britain and has the third-largest military budget in the world, which sounds about right for a country with the world's second-largest economy. "Third-largest," however, is completely misleading, because it reflects little more than the enormous increase in the value of the yen. In 1985 Japan's defense budget was the eighth largest in the world, comparable to those of such questionable powers as Italy and Poland. Since then the budget as measured in yen has gone up steadily but modestly, in pace with the Japanese economy as a whole -- from about 3.1 trillion yen in 1985 to about 3.7 trillion in 1988. As measured in dollars, however, the budget zoomed upward by more than 200 percent in those same three years. Because international budget comparisons are still made in dollars, it's the exchange rate, rather than a real defense buildup, that has propelled Japan toward the top of the charts. Even at these inflated dollar-yen rates, Japan's defense spending is about one tenth of America's, roughly $30 billion a year versus roughly $300 billion. If we use NATO's system of measuring defense budgets, which includes (as Japan's does not) military pensions and other costs in the total, Japan's spending comes to about 1.7 percent of its GNP. This is still much less than that of any major Western country. In terms of the burden the country imposes on itself, Japan has at most the twentieth-largest military budget in the world.
U.S. industry is handicapped in a further way, relative to Japan's. When American military interests have collided with the interests of American companies, U.S. policy has favored the military. It is more convenient for American commanders, for example, if allied nations all use similar equipment. Therefore the Pentagon has willingly licensed advanced weapons technology to NATO countries, Korea, and Japan, so that they can build compatible equipment for themselves. The F-15s that are the backbone of Japan's air force are manufactured in Japan, under license from McDonnell Douglas. This approach, of course, erodes America's technical lead and in many cases has spawned direct competition in the arms business.
Japan's bias has been just the opposite of America's. Its military commanders would be much better off if Japan imported its weapons, rather than building them domestically in small, costly production runs. But, unlike the United States, Japan can put commercial interests over military ones, so it spends 90 percent of its procurement money at home. Last year Japan faced a black-and-white choice between military efficiency and promotion of its own industry, when it selected a new fighter plane for its air force. Every factor except industrial promotion pointed toward one decision: buying the F-16 fighter plane from the United States. The F-16 was available immediately, it was battle-tested, and it was comparatively cheap. This is one case in which every normal market standard favored the U.S.-made product.
And yet Japan attempted for as long as possible to design and build an entirely new airplane, all its own, as an entry to one of the few industries in which it is still behind. The U.S. government was indignant about these plans. Japan eventually threw us a sop, by agreeing to accept the blueprints and technical specifications for the F-16, and, after modifying the wings and radar and certain other parts, to build the new "FSX" planes in Japan, with some American subcontracting. Japan's military will suffer from this deal. The planes won't be ready until the middle of the next decade, and they will cost about twice as much as F-16s. But Japanese industry will, for the first time, have the experience of putting together a modern plane from drawing-board to final assembly.
THE FSX deal is, as The New York Times said in an uncharacteristically sharp-tongued editorial, "one-sided and unfair." But does it, or any other part of the military-spending imbalance, mean that the United Suites can eliminate its burden by changing its military relationship with Japan? Unfortunately, it does not. In principle, Japan could solve the "free ride" problem in either of two ways. It could spend much more on its own defense, or it could pay more of America's costs -- essentially hiring the United States for Pacific defense. The United States will have a very hard time persuading Japan to do either.
The first approach -- putting pressure on Japan to expand its own military -- would be wildly unpopular in Japan and everywhere else in Asia. Japan and its neighbors remember the Second World War in different ways, but the memory leaves all of them hostile to the idea of a strongly re-armed Japan.
It is hard for most Americans to imagine how deep is the fear of Japanese rearmament that spreads across the rest of Asia -- and that persists in Japan as well. Someone who had never opened a history book might look at today's Japan and conclude that the fear was completely absurd. This is about as civilian-looking and nonmilitarized a society as you will find. True, many parts of Japanese life do seem regimented and quasi-military. But these are the civilian parts: the industries, where workers do calisthenics beneath snapping company flags, with martial music booming through the air; the schools, where boys wear shorts all through the winter to show that they are tough. The fierceness and esprit in the military itself cannot compare. There are some 250,000 soldiers in the jieitai (literally, "self-defense force," rather than "army"), but they're practically invisible. Soldiers refuse to wear their uniforms in public; they commute in civilian clothes and change once they get to work. In any case, the uniforms seem bus-conductor-like and deliberately nonmartial, especially by comparison with the severe Prussian-style outfits worn by high school students.
Japan's equivalent of the Pentagon is situated near the Roppongi stop on Tokyo's subway, in a chic tourist and nightclub district. If you ride the Washington, D.C., Metro to the Pentagon stop, you will see uniformed soldiers by the hundreds; I have never seen a uniform in the Roppongi crowds. The Defense Agency proudly releases polls showing that Japanese people have a favorable impression of the military. But according to these same polls, 77 percent of the Japanese public think that the military's most valuable function has been to clean up after typhoons and provide other forms of disaster relief.
In today's Japan of Sony and Toyota, joining the military is a very unfashionable career move and the jieitai has a harder and harder time attracting recruits. It is about 30,000 soldiers below the level authorized by Japanese policy, and there are relatively few people in the reserves.
The army would be in terrible trouble if it were not for the southern island of Kyushu, which contains only about an eighth of Japan's people but seems (judging by the soldiers I've met) to produce most of its recruits. In Kyushu, which has a long history of famous warrior clans, I have heard families say that they wanted their sons to grow up to be soldiers or sailors, but not anywhere else. Three years ago I interviewed cadets at the National Defense Academy, in Yokosuka, where future officers are trained. I asked them why they had chosen careers in the military. The ones who weren't from Kyushu often gave answers like "failed my exams for Todai" (the hallowed University of Tokyo) and "wanted a free education."
There is an air of unseriousness about Japan's military undertakings, which is especially noticeable by comparison with the deadly earnestness of everything else. Soldiers are officially just another kind of government employee: there is no court-martial system, no penalty for refusing to join the military after getting a free education at the academy, no system of emergency laws empowering the military to do what it must for national security. At the Japanese air-force base in Okinawa an officer was giving me a lecture about the supersensitive "hot scramble hangars," where F-4 fighters wait to intercept the Soviet planes that fly close to Japanese air space every two or three days. Just as he finished warning me not to get too close or take any pictures, an All Nippon Airways jumbo jet taxied by, full of vacationers gawking out the windows at the hangars. At Okinawa, as at the other major Japanese air-force base -- Chitose, on the northern island of Hokkaido -- the air force has to share runway space with, and be bossed around by, the civilian airlines. Political "debates" about defense usually begin and end with statistics. "Discussions in the Diet are always and only about the 'one percent limit,'" says Motoo Shiina, one of the rare politicians known as an expert on defense. "You can sulk about one percent for an hour, pro or con, but you shouldn't talk about anything else."
THERE are many explanations for Japan's nonchalance about the military. The most obvious is Article IX of its postwar Constitution, drafted in English by General Douglas MacArthur's occupation experts and translated into stilted Japanese. Contrary to general belief in the United States, this "Peace Constitution" does not set a ceiling on Japanese defense spending. The "limit" of one percent was in fact merely a policy guideline adopted "for the time being" by the Cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976. Eleven years later, under Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan broke the limit when its spending reached 1.004 percent of GNP. The change was more significant than the tiny violation might suggest. For one thing, Nakasone's government presented a Midterm Defense Program, which outlined the new equipment the military would buy from 1986 to 1990. Such plans had existed before, but this was the first one backed up by real money. The government committed 18 trillion yen (about $150 billion at current rates) to be spent on the military over five years, at a time when most domestic spending was being reduced. This should be enough to buy all the weapons listed in the plan, and enough to keep defense spending slightly above one percent of GNP. Also, this move was an attempt to move Japanese defense discussions away from the one-percent obsession, so that budgets could be based on what the military actually needed. In principle, the government now sets budgets without worrying about the limit, but in practice, anything above one percent creates intense political resistance in Japan.
Rather than limiting defense spending, Article IX of the Constitution prohibits it altogether -- or so it seems, if the original English version is taken at face value. "Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained," it says, because Japan "forever renounce[s]" resorting to armed force as a sovereign right. Japan has worked its way toward its current sizable military force through a series of judicial and political "reinterpretations" of the Constitution. The crucial legal concept has been the idea that no nation can renounce the right to defend itself against attack, much as no individual is allowed to sell himself into slavery. Until 1950 MacArthur's policy discouraged Japan from developing an armed force of any sort. But as American soldiers were called away to Korea, MacArthur ordered Japan to establish a National Police Reserve, comprising some 75,000 men, which later evolved into the Ground Self-Defense Force.
Some Japanese intellectuals contend that the half-serious, bastard nature of the jieitai is spiritually bad for the country. Shuichi Kato, a renowned leftist literary critic, was staunchly against the Vietnam War and is always alert for signs of renascent militarism in Japan. But when I first met him, in 1986, he said, "And yet you cannot deny that Americans were risking their lives in Vietnam for something they believed. Japan is not asked to do that now." Hideaki Kase, from the opposite end of Japan's political spectrum, says essentially the same thing. Kase, best known for his veneration of Japan's imperial family, says, "We have been playing a very profitable game of posing as unconscientious objectors. We base our defense policy not on preparation against a hostile threat from the Russians but on the need to placate the Americans." In contrast, Masataka Kosaka, a professor at Kyoto University who is known as one of Japan's few "defense intellectuals," says that Japan's military has a spiritual advantage over those of most other countries. In the age of nuclear weapons, he says, fewer and fewer armies from major countries will actually fight, and yet somehow they must maintain morale. Japan's army has lived with this predicament for more than thirty years, he says, and it will set the model for armies of the twenty-first century.
Whether the hazy legality of the jieitai is good or bad for Japan, it indicates Japan's lack of interest in expanding its military. Public-opinion polls in Japan show overwhelming resistance to increases in defense spending. (In a recent poll 80 percent of respondents favored keeping spending at or below the current level of one percent.) Moreover, Japan's peculiar way of remembering the Second World War intensifies the resistance to re-arming. Japan is not exactly guilt-ridden about its role in the war -- the Peace Memorial Museum, in Hiroshima, for instance, begins its historical narrative with the American firebombing of Tokyo in the spring of 1945, with no mention of any preceding unpleasantness. But Japan seems unanimously and permanently convinced that the war led to catastrophe for the country. Moreover, the prevalent view in Japan is that the war was caused by a clique of semi-crazed militarists, who seized control of the country and forced everyone else into what was clearly a suicidal undertaking. This attitude is tremendously irritating to Chinese or Koreans who are looking for signs of personal contrition from the Japanese, but it actually makes for a very durable kind of anti-militarism -- one based on self-interest. "The war created lasting suspicion of the military, but not because we made other people suffer," Shuichi Kato says. "The memory of the war is that we suffered so much." Most mature Japanese can remember the utter ruin of the postwar years; they blame General Tojo and his cronies for it, and they don't want the military to have another chance.
In the rest of Asia there is more of an edge to memories of Japan's wartime role. As I've listened to officials -- in China, especially -- warn about the danger of a militarized Japan, I've suspected that their fears were partly put on for effect. Japan's war record is one of its few vulnerabilities, and these warnings are a way to get America's attention. Still, I've heard the warnings in every neighboring country (except Burma, where the Japanese are generally viewed as liberators who kicked out the British), and for the most part the apprehension seems sincere. Throughout Asia the least popular American trend is the apparent enthusiasm for big Japanese defense spending. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, has warned for years about the dangers of Japanese re-armament, although recently he has started saying that a bigger Japanese military is inevitable and that the crucial thing is for it to keep working as a junior partner to the Americans. "As long as our military seems firmly under the guidance of the Americans, the rest of Asia will not worry too much," says Masashi Nishihara, a professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy. "If we ever went off independently, everyone would be afraid."
In short, deeply felt emotions in Japan and throughout the rest of Asia put a low ceiling on Japan's potential military spending. Long before the defense budget increased enough to hobble the Japanese economy, it would have provoked some political reaction from China and South Korea, and probably the Soviet Union as well. (Exactly what kind of reaction is impossible to say, but it certainly couldn't leave northeast Asia as free of major conflict as it has been since the Korean Wan) But there is a further limit on Japan's spending: it is hard to see what Japan could spend a lot of extra money for.
THE question of "enough" is hard for any country considering its national defense to resolve, but it is particularly baffling for Japan's military. In theory, Japan could cut its military budget to zero and still feel more or less secure, relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and on the knowledge that no one has dared invade the home islands of Japan since the time of Kublai Khan. Or Japan could equally well decide that its national-security interests extend to every ship that brings in raw materials or carries out exports; in that case, Japan would need to build the world's biggest navy to defend itself completely.
In practice, Japan has defined "enough" by taking on, one after another, jobs that America has handed it during the past two decades. Its military now has three main missions: to be ready to defend the northern island of Hokkaido against a Russian assault; to be able to seal up the crucial straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima, through which the Soviet navy must pass to get from Vladivostok to the open sea, and in general to erect air and sea defenses that will keep the Soviet military bottled up in Siberia in time of war; and to patrol the commercial shipping lanes leading southward from Japan toward the Philippines and the Straits of Malacca. In principle, this means that Japan is now completely responsible for defending itself with conventional weapons against a conventional attack. The U.S. military's part of the bargain is to provide a nuclear deterrent and, through the destroyers and aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet, to do the kind of long-range "power projection" that no Asians want the Japanese to undertake.
Japan's assignments are somewhat vague and open-ended. For instance, the responsibility for defending sea lanes, since 1981 mainly against Soviet submarines, has included a thousand-mile stretch. But exactly how the Japanese will divide this labor with the United States, and how much sea power they will deploy, is unclear. What is clear is that Japan is well on its way to having a big enough army to do its jobs, even at its current "free ride" budget levels. Under the current Midterm Defense Program, Japan is supposed to increase its force of F-15 fighters to 700, and modernize its 100 F-4s. It will replace its older Nike anti-aircraft missiles with Patriot missiles, increase the number of its P-3C anti-submarine aircraft from 50 to 100, and build 10 new destroyer-type surface ships. Even during the Reagan-era military buildup the U.S. inventory of most major weapons shrank, because the cost of weapons rose faster than the budget. For the next few years Japan will be the only major military power in the world that is buying new weapons and at the same time expanding the size of its force. Japanese military officials often say that their forces are small and humble, but most other defense authorities I've interviewed here say that Japan has no urgent need for new hardware which implementing the Midterm Defense Program won't meet.
Japan's military still has some glaring weaknesses. According to U.S. observers, it has never laid in adequate supplies of ammunition, fuel, or spare parts. "They better hope the first volley holds off the Russians," an American military officer says. "They've barely got one reload of missiles." Also, the three branches of the Japanese military are even more uncoordinated and prone to backbiting than the branches of America's are. When a Japan Air Lines jumbo jet crashed in the mountains outside Tokyo in 1985, the rescuers reached the site twelve hours late, in part because the air force, the army, various police forces, and other government agencies were trying to decide who should do what in the rescue effort. The survivors reported that several other people were alive after the crash but died during the night, while the branches of the jieitai spun their wheels. "This delay cost several lives," says Masataka Kosaka, of Kyoto University. "In wartime such behavior would be catastrophic."
Despite such problems, many serious military analysts conclude that Japan is smoothly moving toward "enough." Shunji Taoka, a veteran defense writer for Japan's most prestigious newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, has prepared a dense analysis showing that the Soviet Union lacks the troop carriers and transport planes to overwhelm Japanese defenses during a surprise attack on Hokkaido. Moreover, he says, the Soviet Far Eastern fleet is sure to weaken over the next decade, because its ships are aging faster than they are being replaced. "Japan exercises the responsibility for its own non-nuclear defense," Michael Armacost told me shortly before he was nominated to succeed Mike Mansfield as the U.S. ambassador to Japan. "Japan already possesses substantially more destroyers than we deploy in the Seventh Fleet; it has a larger force of surveillance aircraft than we maintain in the Pacific; it has nearly as many fighter aircraft defending its territory as we have defending the continental United States. This is a significant force and provides solid protection."
Japan can undoubtedly go much further toward having "enough." One executive of an American defense contractor, based in Tokyo, says that he has a vision of "porcupine Japan," bristling with cruise missiles and electronic air-defense systems that protect it against attack without threatening any of its neighbors. Japan can also, and will, increase its foreign-aid payments, which is a subject for another time. But -- to get back to the main point -- nothing in Japan's internal politics, its relations with its neighbors, or its military plans will make it spend enough money to weaken its economy as that of the United States is now weakened.
THAT leaves the other possibility -- forcing Japan to shoulder some of America's military costs. Americans imagine that they have tremendous leverage against Japan on this point: Pay up or we'll leave you exposed. This, however, would be an undignified position for America to take. Worse, it wouldn't work.
As long as the United States remains a military power in the Pacific, it needs Japan's cooperation at least as much as Japan needs U.S. protection. I mean cooperation not in some abstract sense but as a practical matter of where the United States can station its troops and dock its ships. In West Germany and South Korea, American troops are stationed largely near the front, to guarantee that they'd be involved if fighting began. But there is not a single United States soldier in Hokkaido, the most likely invasion site in Japan (to the extent that any site is likely). Of the 55,000 U.S. soldiers and sailors in Japan, two thirds are based in Okinawa, a thousand miles southwest of Tokyo, where they are mainly a swing force to be used in Korea or elsewhere in Asia. The other major concentrations include a U.S. Air Force base in Misawa, in northern Japan, the closest of all American bases to the imposing Soviet military centers on Sakhalin Island; the naval base at Yokosuka, a crucial dry-dock and refitting site for the U.S. Seventh Fleet; Army facilities at Zama and a naval air installation at Atsugi, both near Tokyo; and a Marine air base at Iwakuni, near Hiroshima. "We are not being honest...when we talk as though American overseas military deployments have been essentially altruistic -- not for ourselves but for our allies," Martin Weinstein, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., said in congressional testimony last fall. The real problem for America is not that it has to keep bases in Japan but that it might lose them, according to Dennis J. Doolin, a former Pentagon official who specialized in U.S.-Japanese relations. "We are...in a logistically ideal strategic posture in Northeast Asia," Doolin has written, "and we had better learn to appreciate this fact and stop complaining....Japan's contribution is enormous, unique, irreplaceable, and invaluable."
Moreover, Japan already bears more of the cost of the American troops stationed on its territory than does any other allied country. Its program of "host-country support" covers about 40 percent of the roughly $6 billion cost of keeping American soldiers there, and the Japanese-paid proportion is increasing every year. (Japan says that under its Constitution and its-Status of Forces Agreement with the United States it can't pay the salaries of American soldiers or direct military operating costs, like those for fuel and supplies. It is gradually taking over most other costs.) The presence of foreign troops creates inevitable irritations: think how Americans would feel if, instead of "buying up America" in some theoretical way, the Japanese had soldiers in Chicago and aircraft carriers cruising through the Golden Gate. The Japanese government goes out of its way to deflect resentment of the United States. For instance, when some trees in a diminutive forest were cut down last year to make way for new U.S. military housing, creating a huge controversy, the Defense Agency made clear that Japan's government, not America's, had authorized the project. Just about everything Japan can do for the American military in Japan it is already doing or getting ready to do.
The one big exception to Japan's generally cooperative approach is -- surprise -- its weapons-buying policy. Each time Japan insists on industrial-strategy projects like the FSX, -- it feeds all the worst suspicions about its sense of balance and fair play. But these disputes should be thought of the way the Japanese think of them -- as trade disputes, not military ones. Japan could ease trade frictions, while getting twice as many weapons for its money, if it bought planes and missiles directly from the United States, rather than building them at home. But this will be one of the last areas Japan opens to imports. Japanese officials are quite candid about their determination to develop their own aircraft industry and in general to use military contracts for industrial development. They are less candid about exports of military equipment, which now occur on a small scale and could increase, because the main barrier to them is not Japan's Constitution but its fear of international reaction. Last summer the Tokyo office of Warburg Securities released an influential report on Japan's nascent arms industries, including strong "buy," recommendations for major defense contractors such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan Aircraft Manufacturing, and Fuji Heavy Industries.
Where does this leave America? With little bargaining power to use over Japan in military matters -- and little reason to use it. Japan is happier for having the United States as the big military power in the Pacific, so is the rest of Asia, and so is the United States. Every strategic and military trend in the area is favorable to American interests. There are no wars under way outside Indochina; most countries are becoming richer, freer, and more democratic. The only "threat" most Asian countries pose to the United States is through economic competition. Much of what is right in Asia is right because of the U.S. military presence, which has helped Japan to flourish peacefully and has kept everyone else from worrying about Japan. It would be shortsighted to upset this arrangement just to solve some trade problems. Trade problems are better dealt with on their own.
Copyright © 1989 by James Fallows. All rights reserved.
The Atlantic Monthly; April 1989; Japan: Let them Defend Themselves; Volume 264, No. 4; pages 34 - 38.
Russia and China Striking the United States where it hurts. Part 1
"Russia will also utilize the manpower of China as they make their thrust forward. I realize, My child, that this message has a great emotional impact upon you. Do not be afeared." - Jesus, March 26, 1983
From Asia Times Online Oct 19, 2006:
AMERICA'S ACUPUNCTURE POINTS
PART 1: Striking the US where it hurts
A noted Chinese theorist on modern warfare, Chang Mengxiong, compared China's form of fighting to "a Chinese boxer with a keen knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movements". It is like key acupuncture points in ancient Chinese medicine. Puncture one vital point and the whole anatomy is affected. If America ever goes to war with China, say, over Taiwan, then America should be prepared for the following "acupuncture points" in its anatomy to be "punctured". Each of the vital points can bring America to its knees with a minimum of effort.
1.) Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP) attack
China and Russia are two potential US adversaries that have the capability for this kind of attack. An EMP attack can either come from an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a long-range cruise missile, or an orbiting satellite armed with a nuclear or non-nuclear EMP warhead. A nuclear burst of one (or more) megaton some 400 kilometers over central United States (Omaha, Nebraska) can blanket the whole continental US with electro-magnetic pulse in less than one second.
An EMP attack will damage all electrical grids on the US mainland. It will disable computers and other similar electronic devices with microchips. Most businesses and industries will shut down. The entire US economy will practically grind to a halt. Satellites within line of sight of the EMP burst will also be damaged, adversely affecting military command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles will be rendered unserviceable in their silos. Anti-ballistic missile defenses will suffer the same fate. In short – total blackout. And American society as we know it will be thrown back to the Dark Ages.
Of course, the US may decide to strike first, but China and Russia now have the means of striking back with submarine-launched ballistic missiles with the same or even more devastating results. But knowing China's strategy of "active defense", when war with the US becomes imminent, China will surely not allow itself to be targeted first. It will seize the initiative as mandated by its doctrine by striking first.
China has repeatedly announced that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But as an old Chinese saying goes: "There can never be too much deception in war." If it means the survival of the whole Chinese nation that is at stake, China will surely not allow a public statement to tie its hands and prevent it from seizing the initiative. As another saying goes: "All is fair in love and war."
2.) Cyber attack
America is the most advanced country in the world in the field of information technology (IT). Practically all of its industries, manufacturing, business and finance, telecommunications, key government services and defense establishment rely heavily on computers and computer networks.
But this heavy dependence on computers is a double-edged sword. It has thrust the US economy and defense establishment ahead of all other countries; but it has also created an Achilles' heel that can potentially bring the superpower to its knees with a few keystrokes on a dozen or so laptops.
China's new concept of a "people's war" includes IT warriors coming, not only from its military more than 2-million strong, but from the general citizenry of some 1.3 billion people. If we add the hackers and information warriors from Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria and other countries sympathetic to China, the cyber attack on the US would be formidable indeed.
So, if a major conflict erupts between China and America, more than a few dozen laptops will be engaged to hack America's military establishment; banking system; stock exchange; defense industries; telecommunication system; power grids; water system; oil and gas pipeline system; air traffic and train traffic control systems; C4ISR system, ballistic missile system, and other systems that prop up the American way of life.
America, on the whole, has not adequately prepared itself for this kind of attack. Neither has it prepared itself for a possible EMP attack. Such attacks can bring a superpower like America to its knees with a minimum of movement.
3.) Interdiction of US foreign oil supply
America is now 75% dependent on foreign imported oil. About 23.5% of America's imported oil supply comes from the Persian Gulf. To cut off this oil supply, Iran can simply mine the Strait of Hormuz, using bottom-rising sea mines. It is worthwhile to note that Iran has the world's fourth-largest inventory of sea mines, after China, Russia and the US.
Combined with sea mines, Iran can also block the narrow strait with supersonic cruise missiles such as Yakhonts, Moskits, Granits and Brahmos deployed on Abu Musa Island and all along the rugged and mountainous coastline of Iran fronting the Persian Gulf. This single action can bring America to its knees. Not only America but Japan (which derives 90% of its oil supply) and Europe (which derives about 60% of its oil supply from the Persian Gulf ) will be adversely affected.
In the event of a major conflict involving superpower America and its allies (primarily Japan and Britain) on the one hand and China and its allies (primarily Russia and Iran) on the other, Iran's role will become strategically crucial. Iran can totally stop the flow of oil coming from the Persian Gulf. This is the main reason why China and Russia are carefully nurturing intimate economic, cultural, political, diplomatic and military ties with Iran, which at one time was condemned by US President George W Bush as belonging to that "axis of evil", along with Iraq and North Korea.
This is also the reason why Iran is so brave in daring the US to attack it on the nuclear proliferation issue. Iran knows that it has the power to hurt the US. Without oil from the Gulf, the war machines of the US and its principal allies will literally run out of gas.
A single blow from Iran or China or Russia, or a combination of the three at the Strait of Hormuz can paralyze America. In addition, Chinese and Russian submarines can stop the flow of oil to the US and Japan by interdicting oil tanker traffic coming from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. On the other hand, US naval supremacy will have minimal effect on China's oil supply because it is already connected to Kazakhstan with a pipeline and will soon be connected to Russia and Iran as well.
One wonders: what will be the price of oil if Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz. It will surely drive oil prices sky high. Prolonged high oil prices can, in turn, trigger inflation in the US and a sharp decline of the dollar, possibly even a dollar free-fall. The collapse of the dollar will have a serious impact on the entire US economy.
This brings us to the next "acupuncture point" in the US anatomy: dollar vulnerability.
4.) Attack on the US dollar
One of the pillars propping up US superpower status and worldwide economic dominance is the dollar being accepted as the predominant reserve currency. Central banks of various countries have to stock up dollar reserves because they can only buy their oil requirements and other major commodities in US dollars.
This US economic strength, however, is a double-edged sword and can turn out to be America's economic Achilles' heel. A run of the US dollar, for instance, which would cause a dollar free-fall, can bring the entire US economy toppling down.
What is frightening for the US is the fact that China, Russia and Iran possess the power to cause a run on the US dollar and force its collapse.
China is now the biggest holder of foreign exchange reserves in the world, accumulating $941 billion as of June 30 and expected to exceed a trillion dollars by the end of 2006 - a first in world history. A decision by China to shift a major portion of its reserve to the euro or the yen or gold could trigger other central banks to follow suit. Nobody would want to be left behind holding a bagfull of dollars rapidly turning worthless. The herd psychology would be very difficult to control in this case because national economic survival would be at stake.
This global herd psychology motivated by the survival instinct will be strongly reinforced by the latent anger of many countries in the Middle East, Eurasia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America that silently abhor the pugnacious arrogance displayed by the lone Superpower in the exercise of its unilateral and militaristic foreign policies. They will just be too happy to dump the dollar and watch the lone Superpower squirm and collapse.
The danger of the dollar collapsing is reinforced by the mounting US current account deficit, which sky-rocketed to $900 billion at an annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2005. This figure is 7% of US gross domestic product (GDP), the largest in US history. The current account deficit reflects the imbalance of US imports to its exports. The large imbalance shows that the US economy is losing its competitiveness, with US jobs and incomes suffering as a result.
These record deficits in external trade and current accounts mean that the US has to borrow from foreign lenders (mostly Japan and China) $900 billion annually or nearly $2.5 billion every single day to finance the gap between payments and receipts from the rest of the world. In financial year 2005, $352 billion was spent on interest payment of national debt alone - a national debt that has ballooned to $8.5 trillion as of August 24.
The International Monetary Fund has warned: "The US is on course to increase its net external liabilities to around 40% of its GDP within the next few years - an unprecedented level of external debt for a large industrial country."
The picture of the US federal budget deficit is equally grim. Dennis Cauchon, writing for USA Today said:
The federal government keeps two sets of books. The set the government promotes to the public has a healthier bottom line: a $318 billion deficit in 2005. The set the government doesn't talk about is the audited financial statement produced by the government's accountants following standard accounting rules. It reports a more ominous financial picture: a $760 billion deficit for 2005. If social security and medicare were included - as the board that sets accounting rules is considering - the federal deficit would have been $3.5 trillion. Congress has written its own accounting rules - which would be illegal for a corporation to use because they ignore important costs such as the growing expense of retirement benefits for civil servants and military personnel. Last year, the audited statement produced by the accountants said the government ran a deficit equal to $6,700 for every American household. The number given to the public put the deficit at $2,800 per household ... The audited financial statement - prepared by the Treasury Department - reveals a federal government in far worse financial shape than official budget reports indicate, a USA Today analysis found. The government has run a deficit of $2.9 trillion since 1997, according to the audited number. The official deficit since then is just $729 billion. The difference is equal to an entire year's worth of federal spending.
The huge US current account and trade deficits, the mounting external debt and the ever-increasing federal budget deficits are clear signs of an economy on the edge. They have dragged the dollar to the brink of the precipice. Such a state of economic affairs cannot be sustained for long, and the stability of the dollar is put in grave danger. One push and the dollar will plunge into free-fall. And that push can come from China, Russia or Iran, whom superpower America has been pushing and bullying all along.
We have seen what China can do. How can Russia or Iran, in turn, cause a dollar downfall? On September 2, 2003, Russia and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on oil and gas cooperation. Russia and Saudi Arabia have agreed "to exercise joint control over the dynamics of prices for raw materials on foreign markets". The two biggest oil and gas producers, in cooperation, say, with Iran, could control oil production and sales to keep the price of oil relatively high. Sustained high oil prices, in turn, could trigger a high inflation rate in the US and put extreme pressure on the already weak dollar to trigger a more rapid decline.
Russia is now the world's biggest energy supplier, surpassing Saudi Arabia in energy exports measured in barrel oil equivalent or boe (13.3 million boe per day for Russia vs 10 million boe per day for Saudi Arabia). Russia has the biggest gas reserves in the world. Iran, on the other hand, runs second in the world to Russia in gas reserves, and also ranks among the top oil producers. If and when either Russia or Iran, or both, shift away from a rapidly declining dollar in energy transactions, many oil producers will follow suit. These include Venezuela, Indonesia, Norway, Sudan, Nigeria and the Central Asian Republics.
There is a good chance that even Saudi Arabia and the other oil-exporting countries in the Middle East may follow suit. They wouldn't want to be left with fast-shrinking dollars when the shift from petro-dollar to euro-dollar occurs. Again, the herd psychology will come into play, and the US will eventually be left with a dollar that is practically worthless. Considering the strong anti-American sentiments in the world caused by American unilateralism, especially in the Middle East, a concerted effort to dump the dollar in favor of the euro becomes even more plausible.
When the dollar was removed from the gold standard in August 1971, the dollar gained its strength through its use as the currency of choice in oil transactions. Once the dollar is rejected in favor of the euro or another currency for global oil transactions, the dollar will rapidly lose its value and central banks all over the world will be racing to diversify to other currencies. The shift from petro-dollar to petro-euro will have a devastating effect on the dollar. It could cause the dollar to collapse; and the whole US economy crushing down with it - a scene reminiscent of the collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. But this one will be a thousand times more devastating.
A successful assault on the US dollar will make America crawl on its knees with a minimum of movements. And this assault can come from China, Russia or Iran - or a combination of the three - if they ever decide that they have had enough of US bullying.
5.) Diplomatic isolation
In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed from its own weight, the US emerged as the sole superpower in the world. At that crucial period, it would have been a great opportunity for the US to establish its global leadership and dominance worldwide. With the world's biggest economy, its control of international financial institutions, its huge lead in science and technology (specially information technology) and its unequaled military might, America could have seized the moment to establish a truly American Century.
But in the critical years after 1991, America had to make a choice between two divergent approaches to the use of its almost unlimited power: soft power or hard power. The exercise of soft power would have seen America leading the world in the fight against poverty, disease, drugs, environmental degradation, global warming and other ills plaguing humankind.
It would have pushed America in leading the move to address the debt burden of poor, undeveloped or developing countries; promoting distance learning in remote rural areas to empower the poor economically by providing them access to quality education; and helped poor countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America build highways, railways, ports, airports, hospitals, schools and telecommunication systems.
Unfortunately, such was not to be. If there was any effort at the exercise of soft power at all, it was minimal. In fact, it is not America which is practicing soft power in diplomacy but a rising power in the East - China. China has been busy in the past decade or so exercising soft power in almost all countries in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, winning most of the countries in these regions to its side. Through the use of soft power, China has created a de facto global united front under its silent, low-key leadership.
The US, on the other hand, decided to employ mainly hard power in the exercise of its global power. It adapted the policy of unilateralism and militarism in its foreign policy. It discarded the United Nations and even the advice of close allies. It unilaterally discarded signed international treaties (such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). It adapted the policy of regime change and preventive war. It led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the 78-day bombing of Serbia purportedly for "humanitarian" reasons. It invaded Afghanistan and Iraq without UN sanctions and against the advice of key European allies like France and Germany.
The US-led war in Iraq was a tactical victory for the US initially, but has resulted in strategic defeat overall. The Iraq war caused the US to lose its principal allies in Europe and be isolated, despised and hated in many parts of the world. Without too many friends and allies, the US is likened to an "emperor with no clothes".
So in a major conflict between America and China, isolated America cannot possibly win against a global united front led by China and Russia.
This brings us to the question of alliances, another "acupuncture point" in the anatomy of the superpower, which will be addressed in the second part of this report.
Russia and China Striking the United States with the Assassin's Mace. Part 2
"Russia will also utilize the manpower of China as they make their thrust forward. I realize, My child, that this message has a great emotional impact upon you. Do not be afeared." - Jesus, March 26, 1983
If America ever goes to war with China, Chinese military doctrine suggests the US should expect attacks on a number of key points where it is particularly vulnerable - where a single jab would paralyze the entire nation. China would aim at targets such as the US electricity grid, its computer networks, its oil supply routes, and the dollar. Other vital "acupuncture" points are outlined below.
1.) A powerful triumvirate
No one ever imagined before 1991 that China and Russia would come together to form a close-knit alliance politically, diplomatically and, most important of all, militarily. For more than three decades before the break-up of the Soviet Union, China and the USSR had been bitter rivals, even going into a shooting war with each other along their common border.
But now the picture has changed completely. China and Russia have embraced one another and help each other ward off the military advances of the lone superpower in their respective backyards. In fact, it was a series of strategic blunders by the superpower that forced China and Russia into each other's arms. How so?
When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, it would have been the best time for the US to use soft power to win over Russia into the Western fold. Russia at that time was an economic basket case, with the price of oil at $9 per barrel. But the promises of economic assistance from the US and Europe proved empty, and the Russian oligarchs were the main beneficiaries of relations with the Western powers.
NATO and EU then slowly advanced eastward, absorbing many of the countries making up the former Warsaw Pact alliance. Serbia, a close ally of Russia, was subjected to 78 days of continuous air bombardment. Regime changes were instigated by US and Western-financed non-governmental organizations in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan - all former Soviet republics and considered Russia’s backyard - giving Russia a feeling of strategic encirclement by the US and its allies. There was also the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the establishment of US bases and deployment of troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
These aggressive geopolitical moves by the US pushed Russia into the waiting arms of China, which badly needed Russian energy resources, modern weapon systems and military technology as a consequence of the US-led arms embargo imposed after the Tienanmen incident. Furthermore, China also needed a reliable and militarily capable ally in Russia because of the perceived threat of the US.
Reinforcing this Chinese perception was the outrageously wanton bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by US-led NATO forces in 1999; the spy plane incident in 2001; the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the ABM Treaty in 2002; the enhanced military cooperation between the US and Japan; the inclusion of Taiwan in the Theater Missile Defense program.; the setting up of a military base in Kyrgyzstan which is only some 250 miles from the Chinese border near Lop Nor, China’s nuclear testing ground.
Add to that the announcement of President George W Bush that the US would come to the aid of Taiwan in the event that China uses force against it; the sending of two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters near Taiwan in 1995-1996; and the naval show of strength of seven aircraft carrier battle groups converging off the China coast in August 2004. All these aggressive moves by superpower America pushed China to embrace its former bitter rival, Russia.
Both China and Russia needed a secure and reliable rear; and both are ideally positioned to provide it. Moreover, their strengths ideally complement each other. It must be borne in mind that both are nuclear powers. The abundant energy resources of Russia ensures that China will not run out of gas in a major conflict - a strategic advantage over the US and its key allies.
Russia is also supplying China with many of the modern armaments and military technology it needs to modernize its defense sector. This effectively militates against the arms embargo imposed by the US and the EU on China. Russia in turn needs the increased trade with China, China’s financial clout and assistance, and manufactured goods.
The coming together of China and Russia was one of the most earth-shaking geopolitical events of modern times. Yet hardly anyone noticed the transition from bitter enemity to a solid geopolitical, economic, diplomatic and military alliance. The combined strengths of the two regional powers surely surpass that of the former Warsaw Pact. If we add Iran to the equation, we have a triumvirate that can pose a formidable challenge to the lone superpower. Iran is the most industrialized and the most populous nation in the Middle East. It is second only to Russia in terms of gas resources and also one of the largest oil producers in the world. It is also one of the most mountainous countries in the world, which makes it ideal for the conduct of asymmetric and guerrilla warfare against a superior adversary.
Iran borders both the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, two of the richest oil and gas regions of the world. Most importantly, it controls the gateway to the Persian Gulf - the Strait of Hormuz. Modern bottom-rising, rocket propelled sea mines and supersonic cruise missiles deployed along the long mountainous coastline of Iran, manned by "invisible" guerrillas, could indefinitely stop the flow of oil from the Gulf, from which the US gets 23% of its imported oil.
Japan also derives 90% of its oil from the Persian Gulf area, and Europe about 60%. In a major conflict, Iran can effectively deprive the US war machine and those of its key allies of much needed energy supplies.
Imagine the war machine of the superpower running out of gas. Imagine also a US economy minus 23% of its imported oil. This 23% can rise considerably once Chinese and Russian submarines start sinking US-bound oil tankers. The triumvirate of China, Russia, and Iran could bring the US to its knees with a minimum of movement.
2.) The US's geopolitical disadvantage
Another "acupuncture point" in America’s anatomy in the event of a major conflict with China (and Russia) is its inherent disadvantage dictated by geography. Being the lone superpower, any major conventional conflict involving the US will necessitate its bringing its forces to bear on its adversaries. This means that the US must cross the Pacific, Indian, and/or Atlantic Oceans in order to bring logistics or troop reinforcements to the battlefield.
In so doing, the US will be crossing thousands of miles of sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that can easily become a gauntlet of deadly Chinese and Russian submarines lying in ambush with bottom-rising sea mines, supercavitating rocket torpedoes, and supersonic cruise missiles that even aircraft carrier battle groups have no known defense against. Logistic and transport ships and oil tankers are particularly vulnerable.
The air corridors above these sea lanes will also be put at great risk by advanced air defense systems aboard Sovremenny destroyers or similar types of warships in Chinese and Russian inventories. In short, the US will be forced by geography to suffer all the disadvantages of conducting offensive operations against adversaries in Eurasia.
Of course, the US has "forces in being" and "logistics in place" in numerous military bases scattered around the world, especially those strategically encircling China, Russia, and Iran. But when the shooting war starts, these bases will be the first to be hit by barrages of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and long-range land-attack cruise missiles armed with electro-magnetic pulse, anti-radar, thermobaric, and conventional warheads.
Following the missile barrages, the remnants of such weakened US military bases will easily be overwhelmed by blitzkrieg assaults from Russian and Chinese armored divisions in the Eurasian mainland. China, for instance, has four large armored units constantly on standby, poised to cross the Yili Corridor in Xinjiang province at a moment’s notice. The US base in Kyrgyzstan near the Chinese border would not stand a chance.
China, Russia and/or Iran, on the other hand, will operate on interior lines within the Eurasian mainland. When they move troops and logistics to meet any threat on the continent, they will have relatively secure lines of communication and logistics, using inland highways, railways and air transport.
Since the US cannot correct the dictates of geography, it and its main allies Japan and the UK will have to live and fight with this tremendous geopolitical disadvantage. Of course the US can bypass this geographic obstacle if it attacks China and Russia with its intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers in a nuclear first strike, but China and Russia have the means to retaliate and obliterate the United States and its allies as well.
There are some among the leading neo-conservatives in the US who believe that a nuclear war is winnable; that there is no such thing as mutually assured destruction (MAD). Well, that truly mad way of thinking may well spell the end of planet earth for all of us.
3.) Asymmetric attack
Superpower America is particularly vulnerable to asymmetric attack. A classic example of asymmetric attack is the September 11, 2001, attack on America. Nineteen determined attackers, armed with nothing but box cutters, succeeded in toppling the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and causing the death of some 3,000 Americans. Notice the asymmetry of casualty ratio as well - the most lopsided casualty ratio ever recorded in history.
China, Russia, and Iran also possess asymmetric weapons that are designed to neutralize and defeat a superpower like America in a conventional conflict. Supersonic cruise missiles now in their inventories can defeat and sink US aircraft carriers. The same is true for medium- and short-range ballistic missiles with independently targetable warheads, extra-large bottom-rising, rocket-propelled sea mines (EM52s), and supercavitating rocket torpedoes (SHKVAL or "Squall"). The US Navy has no known defense against these weapons.
Iraqi insurgents are conducting a form of asymmetric warfare. They use improvised explosive devices, car bombs, booby traps and landmines against the most modern army the world has ever seen. The US's huge advantage in weaponry is negated by the fact that its soldiers cannot see their adversary. They are fighting against a "phantom" enemy - an invisible army.
And how can you win against an enemy you cannot see? This may be one reason why reports of massacres of Iraqi civilians by US soldiers have been increasing lately. But turning sophisticated weapons against civilians will never win wars for America. It will only heighten the rage of the victimized population and increase suicide bombings against US forces.
Connected to asymmetric warfare is asynchronous warfare, where the weaker side bides its time to strike back. And it strikes at a time and place where the adversary is totally unprepared.
For example, if the US were to strike Iran’s underground nuclear facilities with bunker-busting tactical nuclear warheads, Iran could bide its time until it develops its own nuclear weapons. It could then use its Kilo class submarines, equipped with supersonic "moskit" cruise missiles armed with Iran’s own nuclear warheads, to hit New York, or Washington, DC as a payback to the US for using nuclear weapons against Iran. Or the Iranians could infiltrate nuclear scientists into the US, where they would fabricate a "dirty" bomb to be detonated near the US Congress, in full session while the president is making his annual state of the nation address.
The possibilities for asymmetric and asynchronous warfare are limitless. Various weapons are available to the asymmetric or asynchronous attacker. If a simple box cutter produced such devastating results on September 11, 2001, imagine what chemical or biological weapons dropped from a private aircraft could do to a crowded city; or trained hackers attacking the US banking system and other key infrastructure and basic services; or man-portable surface-to-air missiles attacking US airlines taking off or landing in various airports around the globe; or non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons hitting New York City or the US Capitol. No amount of even the best intelligence in the world can totally guard against and stop a determined asymmetric attacker.
4.) Attack on US's command and control
C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In a war situation, C4ISR is a prime target because therein lies the center of gravity of one's adversary. Neutralizing C4ISR is like cutting off the head of a chicken. It can run around in circles for a while, but will soon collapse and die. The same is true in warfare.
Having the mightiest and most modern armed forces in the world, America prides itself with having the most sophisticated and advanced C4ISR. US military spy satellites can gather intelligence data and disseminate it on a real time basis. US surveillance and reconnaissance satellites are so sophisticated that their sensors can detect objects on Earth as small as one-tenth of a meter in size, from several hundred miles up. Satellite sensors can also penetrate clouds and bad weather or see in the night. Some of these spy satellites can also monitor radio or telephone conversations.
Aside from communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, satellites are also used for navigation, most especially in guiding ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and other smart weapon systems to their targets. Without satellite guidance, such "smart" and precision weapons turn into "dumb" bombs and directionless missiles.
The advances in C4ISR are rapidly revolutionizing warfare. Gathering, processing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence is now made possible on a real-time or near real-time basis on a global or regional level. Because of these developments, a new war principle is emerging in the modern battlefield: "If the enemy sees you; you are dead."
The US is far advanced in its C4ISR compared with, for instance, China. China cannot hope to catch up and match the American system anytime soon. So in order for China to survive in the event of a major conflict with the US, China has to resort to asymmetric means. This means that China has to develop effective means of countering and neutralizing America’s C4ISR. And that is what China had been working on for more than two decades now.
The heart of America’s C4ISR lies in its technologically sophisticated satellites. But this seeming strength is also an Achilles' heel. Neutralize or destroy the key satellites, and America’s major forces, such as aircraft carrier battle groups, are blinded, muted, and decapitated. This concept is part of China’s strategy for "defeating a superior with an inferior" called shashaojian, or "assassin’s mace". It is like the mace kept by ladies in their bags, which they use when attacked by a mugger or rapist. They squirt the mace into the eyes of an attacker to temporarily blind him, giving the intended victim time to escape.
China now has the capability to identify and track satellites. And for more than two decades they have been busy developing anti-satellite weapons. China has been developing maneuverable nano-satellites that can neutralize other satellites. They do their work by maneuvering near a target satellite and neutralizing the target by electronic jamming, electro-magnetic pulse generation, clinging to the target and physically destroying it, bumping the target out of orbit, or simply exploding to bring the target satellite down with it. Such nano satellites can be launched in batches on demand by road-mobile DF21 or DF31 booster rockets.
Another anti-satellite weapon in the works is a land-based laser that blinds the sensitive sensors of satellites or even destroys them completely. Of course, if worse comes to worst, China can always use its weapon of last resort, destroying adversary satellites with a high-altitude nuclear burst. But this will only be used if China has not yet fully developed the other options when major hostilities start. With the neutralization of its C4ISR, America would be like "a blind man trying to catch fish with his bare hands", to quote Mao Zedong. In short, America would be brought to its knees.
5.) Attack on US aircraft carrier battle groups
Aircraft carrier battle groups are the mainstay of US military supremacy. They serve as America’s chief instrument for global power projection and world dominance. In this category, the US has no equal. At the moment, the US maintains a total of 12 aircraft carrier battle groups. In comparison, China has none.
From June to August 2004, the US, for the first time in its naval history, conducted an exercise involving the simultaneous convergence of seven of its 12 aircraft carrier battle groups to within striking distance of China’s coast. This was the biggest and most massive show of force the world has ever seen. It was to remind China that if it uses force against Taiwan, China will have to contend with this kind of response.
It was mentioned earlier that China’s strategy in defeating the superior by the inferior is shashaojian or the "assassin’s mace". "Mace" is not only a blinding spray; it is also a meaner and deadlier weapon, a spiked war club of ancient times used to knock out an adversary with one blow. The spikes of the modern Chinese mace may well spell the end for aircraft carriers.
The first of these spikes consists of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles (modified and improved DF 21s/CSS-5 and DF 15s) with terminally guided maneuverable re-entry vehicles with circular error probability of 10 meters. DF 21s/CSS-5s can hit slow-moving targets at sea up to 2,500km away.
The second spike is an array of supersonic and highly accurate cruise missiles, some with range of 300km or more, that can be delivered by submarines, aircraft, surface ships or even common trucks (which are ideal for use in terrain like that of Iran along the Persian Gulf). These supersonic cruise missiles travel at more than twice the speed of sound (mach 2.5), or faster than a rifle bullet. They can be armed with conventional, anti-radiation, thermobaric, or electro-magnetic pulse warheads, or even nuclear warheads if need be. The Aegis missile defense system and the Phalanx Close-in Defense weapons of the US Navy are ineffective against these supersonic cruise missiles.
A barrage of these cruise missiles, followed by land-based intermediate- or short-range ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems, could wreak havoc on an aircraft carrier battle group. Whether there are seven or 15 carrier battle groups, it will not matter, for China has enough ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy them all. Unfortunately for the US and British navies, they do not have the capacity to counter a barrage of supersonic cruise missile followed by a second barrage of ballistic missiles.
The first and second spikes of the "assassin’s mace" are sufficient to render the aircraft carrier battle groups obsolete. But there is a third spike which is equally dreadful. This is the deadly SHKVAL or "Squall" rocket torpedo developed by Russia and passed on to China. It is like an under-water missile. It weighs 6,000lbs and travels at 200 knots or 230mph, with a range of 7,500 yards. It is guided by autopilot and with its high speed, makes evasive maneuvers by carriers or nuclear submarines highly difficult. It is truly a submarine and carrier buster; and again, the US and its allies have no known defense against such a supercavitating rocket torpedo.
The "assassin’s mace" has still more spikes. The fourth spike consists of extra-large, bottom-rising, rocket-propelled sea mines laid by submarines along the projected paths of advancing carrier battle groups. These sea mines are designed specifically for targeting aircraft carriers. They can be grouped in clusters so that they will hit the carriers in barrages.
The final spike of the mace is a fleet of old fighter aircraft (China has thousands of them) modified as unmanned combat aerial vehicles fitted with extra fuel tanks and armed with stand-off anti-ship missiles. They are also packed with high explosives so that after firing off their precision-guided anti-ship missiles on the battle group, they will then finish their mission by dive-bombing "kamikaze" style into their targets.
If we now combine the mace as a means of blinding an adversary and the mace as a spiked war club, one can see the complete picture of how China will use the "assassin’s mace" to send America’s aircraft carrier battle groups into the dustbin of naval history. Although China does not possess a single operational aircraft carrier, it has converted the entire China mainland into a "virtual aircraft carrier" that is unsinkable and capable of destroying all the aircraft carrier battle groups that the US and its allies can muster.
The sad part for the US Navy is that even if American leaders and naval theorists realize the horrible truth that aircraft carriers have been rendered obsolete in modern warfare by China’s "assassin’s mace", the navy cannot just change strategy or discard its carriers. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been poured into those weapon systems and hundreds of thousands of jobs would be affected if such behemoths are turned into scrap. Besides, even if US Navy authorities wanted to change strategy, the all-powerful and influential military-industrial complex lobby would not allow it.
So, if and when a major conflict between the US and China occurs, say over the issue of Taiwan, pity those thousands of American sailors who are unfortunate enough to be in one of those aircraft carrier battle groups. They won't stand a chance.
A challenge to America
The 10 "acupuncture points" mentioned in this article (See also Part 1: Striking the US where it hurts) are like a 10-stage riddle. It is an "assassin's mace" or war club of olden times with 10 deadly spikes. Any one of those spikes can bring America to its knees. I therefore throw this riddle to the think tanks in the Pentagon, to the US Congress, to the president's men, to US academe, and to every concerned American.
America is in the last two minutes of the fourth quarter of the "great game", and it is behind in points. If America can solve the riddle in time, it wins the game, it can seize global leadership, and the 21st century will truly be the American Century.
On the other hand, failure to solve the riddle will shake America to its very foundation and cause this great nation to collapse - just like that vivid image of the collapsing Twin Towers familiar to each and every American. America loses, and it will be down and out for the rest of this century.
Wake up, America!
It was very apparent that Japan would not left one finger to help the US against anyone, and that they still have a big grudge with the United States of America.
So doing so research I put up several likely reasons that the people of Japan may not want to help us, but we still have to help them. . . -KHS
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Why are the people who live in Japan angry with the USA over something that happened 67 years ago? Japan started the war so why are they angry we ended it on the USA terms?
Best Answer: Japan doesn't believe they started the war and doesn't teach they did in schools. Instead they teach that they were minding their own business and we attacked them first. The rest of the war and the way we ended it then are just ways we "added insult to injury".
Japan of course had been an isolationist for many years before finally deciding to follow the footsteps of many European countries and started trying to colonize (for both more room and more resources). They attacked many of the countries around them including China and Russia (winning both battles) and were making their way around the islands of the Pacific (as much as anything else to get resources needed to continue their war against China and eventually Russia). The U.S. went over there to defend the freedom of these independent islands (both for their well being and for ours) and Japan tried to roll right over us, initially having a little success.
They then of course attacked Pearl Harbor to try to eliminate any other obstacles to their aggression and were monumentally successful due as much to the many stupid mistakes we made in defending the island (most of which were caused by our opinion that Japan would never attack us directly) as their own careful and deliberate planning.
Getting on to your actual question, what we did (necessary or not) was horrible of course - we intentionally attacked civilians and wiped out two cities to make a point. Had they not surrendered when they did, we likely would have attacked a more heavily populated town. Many believe that this was not necessary as the war was "about to end anyway". The conventional thinking at the time though was that we needed to have a catastrophic blow against Japan of some kind to get them to agree to surrender, which because of their pride, they may have been unlikely to do even with a prolonged period of defeats and the alternative to nuclear attack (to assure a quick resolution) would have been an invasion of Tokyo which would have taken exponentially more lives including both ours and theirs.
I have met alot of people from the war, and even have had relatives who served, who were captured by the Japanese and tortured so violently by them that they never recovered (they either suffered terrible physical trauma, or mental trauma that crippled them for the rest of their lives) and not one of them have ever received an apology (or even an admission of guilt) for any of the things the Japanese did to them, many of which were so horribly terrific and disgusting I won't even write down here. However we have officially apologized for ending a war we didn't start in such a way that caused alot of death and destruction, but probably saved alot more death and destruction were we to carry out the necessary battles to win the war in the conventional way. That doesn't make what we did to them right, but it does make their complaints seem more hypocritical and unbelievable,
I don't think there is such a thing as someone who is 100% right and someone else who is 100% wrong in any conflict. Alot of different things led up to the start and the end of the war and nobody came through it smelling like roses. But when someone (a country in this case) does something they know is wrong (tries to forcibly take over every country within a 1000 miles of them and then ravishes those countries resources and enslaves their people for the war effort) they shouldn't whine about what happens to them when they fail.
We do alot of stupid things too in the world, but after every conflict we have ever had abroad, we have gone back and rebuilt those countries and pumped money into their economies and fought for them to have freedoms greater than they ever imagined before (Japan was an Imperial dictatorship before the war). I am not certain, but I don't believe Japan has ever given us one single Yen for the death and destruction they caused in Hawaii, or Guam, or given anyone else in the pacific any money to rebuild after the destruction caused by their violent and unprovoked attacks.
The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50
Still a Grand Bargain?
By George R. Packard
From our March/April 2010 Issue
On January 19, 1960, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter signed a historic treaty. It committed the United States to help defend Japan if Japan came under attack, and it provided bases and ports for U.S. armed forces in Japan. The agreement has endured through half a century of dramatic changes in world politics -- the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the rise of China -- and in spite of fierce trade disputes, exchanges of insults, and deep cultural and historical differences between the United States and Japan. This treaty has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
Given its obvious success in keeping Japan safe and the United States strong in East Asia, one might conclude that the agreement has a bright future. And one would be wrong. The landslide electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) last August, after nearly 54 years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, has raised new questions in Japan about whether the treaty's benefits still outweigh its costs.
LABOR PAINS
Back in 1952, when an earlier security treaty (which provided the basis for the 1960 treaty) entered into force, both sides thought it was a grand bargain. Japan would recover its independence, gain security at a low cost from the most powerful nation in the region, and win access to the U.S. market for its products. Without the need to build a large military force, Japan would be able to devote itself to economic recovery. The United States, for its part, could project power into the western Pacific, and having troops and bases in Japan made credible both its treaty commitments to defend South Korea and Taiwan and its policy of containment of the Soviet Union and communist China.
But there was also much to be unhappy about, especially for the Japanese. This was an agreement negotiated between a victor and an occupied nation, not equal sovereign states. The Japanese government, which had never in its history accepted foreign troops on its soil, was now forced to agree to the indefinite presence of 260,000 U.S. military personnel at more than 2,800 bases across the country. Practical arrangements for the troops' stationing were left to an administrative agreement that did not require the approval of the Diet, the Japanese parliament. This gave the United States the right to quell large-scale internal disturbances in Japan. Against their better judgment, Japan's leaders were also forced to agree to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of all of China. Meanwhile, the U.S. government made no specific commitment to defend Japan and retained the freedom to use its troops anywhere in East Asia.
The United States also came to have misgivings about the terms of the alliance. Under Article 9 of Japan's 1947 constitution, which General Douglas MacArthur had forced on the country, Japan renounced "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force in settling international disputes" and undertook never to maintain "land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential." The U.S. government soon regretted this language: Japan could invoke it as an excuse to stay out the United States' future wars. Indeed, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida found ways to resist Washington's urgings to build up Japan's army. Not only had the United States undertaken to come to Japan's defense in case of an attack while Japan had no reciprocal obligation, but Japan insisted that its constitution prohibited it from exercising the right of collective self-defense and thus from ever sending troops or vessels to help Americans in combat operations.
By 1957, buoyed by the country's rising prosperity and new nationalism, the postwar generation of Japanese college students, Marxist intellectuals, and labor unionists, among others, started to chafe at the inequalities embedded in the treaty. The U.S. troops living on bases in Japan had brought crime and caused accidents; the agreement still risked dragging Japan into war with China or North Korea or the Soviet Union. Kishi staked his political life on improving the agreement's terms for Japan. After three years of hard bargaining, a revised treaty, which could be abrogated after ten years, was hammered out. The U.S. government committed to defending Japan if it was attacked. It agreed to consult Japan in advance of any major changes in the deployment of its troops or equipment or in its use of its bases in Japan for combat operations.
Although the revised treaty improved Japan's leverage, Japanese left-wingers, among others, used the ratification process to express their disapproval of the entire U.S.-Japanese alliance system. Kishi battled his left-wing critics for months, melees broke out in the Diet, and thousands of Japanese protested in massive street demonstrations. On May 19, 1960, Kishi suddenly forced a vote to ratify the treaty in the lower house, calling on the police to remove his Socialist opponents for staging sit-downs and blocking the Speaker from calling the Diet to order. Too clever by half, the maneuver aroused even greater and more violent street protests, and a state visit by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, timed to coincide with the revised treaty's ratification, had to be canceled. The treaty was eventually approved, and it was ratified on June 23, but Kishi announced his resignation the same day. The Liberal Democratic Party, the dominant conservative party, had learned that it could not impose its will on the opposition on matters of war and peace.
The road ahead was bumpy, too. In the late 1960s, Japan was wracked by violent demonstrations opposing the United States' war in Vietnam. In 1971, angered by Japan's huge export surplus with the United States and by what he considered a betrayal by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato -- Sato had apparently promised to curb the flood of Japanese textiles into the U.S. market in exchange for the return of U.S.-controlled Okinawa to the Japanese -- President Richard Nixon delivered three blows to Japan. First, after pressuring Tokyo to support the government in Taiwan for years, Nixon, without any prior notice, sent his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to Beijing to discuss rapprochement with China. Then, again without warning, he took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard, causing the yen to surge in value and thus severely hurting Japan's export-led economy. Finally, citing the U.S. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, Nixon imposed a ten percent tax on imports from Japan. Those three actions, which are known in Japan today as "the Nixon shocks," shattered the image of the United States as Japan's benevolent protector.
The 1980s were ever more fractious. Growing concerned about continuing trade deficits, the dominance of Japanese companies in many U.S. markets, and the trade barriers that kept U.S. products out of the Japanese market, the U.S. government in 1985 forced an agreement on Japan that would limit the import of Japanese computer chips to the United States. The next year, it levied a fine on Tokyo for violating the agreement. Other countermeasures followed. On July 2, 1987, members of the U.S. Congress smashed a Toshiba radio with sledgehammers in time for the evening news to protest revelations that Toshiba had sold classified technology to the Soviets. A small group of revisionist writers spread the notion in the U.S. mainstream media that Japan was hell-bent on destroying the United States' industrial sector; according to this argument, Japan wanted to win through unfair trade practices what it could not win in World War II. By the end of the decade, wariness of Japan was intense. In a 1989 Gallup poll, 57 percent of U.S. respondents said they considered Japan to be a greater threat to the United States than the Soviet Union. It took the bursting of Japan's economic bubble and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to keep tensions between the United States and Japan from getting any worse.
When Bill Clinton came to power in 1993, he, as well as many members of his administration, had been much influenced by the notion that Japan was the enemy. But the value of the security treaty between the two countries was brought home to Washington after North Korea's testing of nuclear weapons in 1993-94 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. In a 1996 report, Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense for national security affairs, succeeded in getting a joint statement adopted that committed the United States to keeping 100,000 troops in East Asia and reaffirmed the United States' resolve to defend Japan. Still, there were misunderstandings and gaffes: President Clinton shocked the Japanese when he visited Beijing for nine days in 1998 and declared China a strategic partner, without so much as stopping for a day in either Tokyo or Seoul. New guidelines for defense cooperation were adopted in 1997-98, spelling out details about the United States' access to rear-area support in Japan and to supplies and airports in the event of an emergency. After North Korea test-fired a two-stage ballistic missile over Japan in 1998, Tokyo agreed to cooperate with Washington and share technology on anti-ballistic-missile defense.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Despite some frictions, both the United States and Japan have found that the benefits of the treaty have generally outweighed its costs. Over the years, the treaty has evolved from being a statement of intentions to being a reasonably credible operating system. Certainly, the benefits for Japan always remained clear. Falling under the U.S. nuclear umbrella freed up Tokyo to carry out the so-called Yoshida Doctrine and focus on the country's economic growth; without the need to acquire nuclear weapons, Japan could almost always hold its defense budget to less than one percent of GDP. The treaty also preserved Japan's access to the U.S. market, which served as a life vest in a sea of sometimes serious trade disputes. All of this gave Japan a chance to nurture the fragile roots of parliamentary democracy, turning them into a robust and durable system.
For the United States, the treaty's long-term benefits included having the equivalent of an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" (as Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone put it in 1983) to carry out its forward strategy in East Asia. The agreement gave the U.S. Navy a strategic advantage in observing the movements of Soviet warships and, in case of war, an easy way to bottle up the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. And Washington benefited from the comparatively low cost of basing troops in East Asia, which was especially advantageous in this case because Japan was committed to being a generous host.
Over the years, Japan has also taken a number of steps to alleviate the Pentagon's concerns that it was free-riding on the United States for its security. In 1977, it took steps toward making its equipment and communications interoperable with those of U.S. forces in the country, and it started to engage in joint planning and training exercises. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Nakasone reached an agreement under which Japan would exclude from its ban on arms exports defense technology exports to the United States. Japan has also gradually overcome its reluctance to send troops abroad. In 1992, after having sat out the Persian Gulf War, it passed legislation allowing its troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Since 1992, Japanese troops have engaged in such missions in Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Mozambique, the Palestinian territories, and Rwanda. From 2001 until mid-January this year, Japan kept naval vessels in the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan; it also committed 600 troops to Iraq (albeit in a relatively peaceful zone), and it has (if grudgingly) allowed U.S. nuclear-powered vessels to dock at Japanese ports. Japan now has the seventh-largest military budget in the world.
One issue that remains sensitive in the relationship is nuclear weapons. Because of its understandable allergy to all things nuclear, after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, since 1960 Japan has insisted that no U.S. nuclear weapon could be based on its territory. In 1967, Prime Minister Sato unilaterally declared his now famous three principles against nuclear weapons: Tokyo would not manufacture, possess, or introduce such weapons into Japan. This posed a problem for Tokyo. Could U.S. ships and planes carry nuclear weapons while in transit through Japanese ports and airports without violating that third principle? As it happens, a secret agreement signed in 1960 (and subsequently declassified in the United States) provided that they could. Still, the Japanese government continues to take the position that no such agreement exists: after all, it argues, an exchange of notes accompanying the 1960 security treaty required Washington to consult Tokyo prior to bringing any nuclear weapons into Japan, and Washington has never done so. Meanwhile, it is the policy of the U.S. government to neither confirm nor deny the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons anywhere at any time.
The new Hatoyama cabinet has appointed a high-level panel of respected outside experts to investigate whether secret agreements exist between the two governments. As of the time of this writing, the panel was close to announcing that such a deal does indeed exist -- thereby revealing that since 1960, successive Japanese governments have lied to the Japanese people. Other deals are also likely to be disclosed: deals about allowing the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Okinawa in times of emergency, about a joint-combat strategy in the event of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and about an alleged payment by Japan to the United States to cover the costs involved in the formal return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Revealing the existence of these agreements at the time they were struck would have set off political fireworks; it might even have brought down governments. Today, the Japanese public has been sufficiently well informed by its media to take the news of their existence in stride. Still, the disclosures will only add to the cost side of the ledger for Japan.
A NEW LANDSCAPE
Japan's new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, is one of the more unusual and interesting Japanese politicians since the end of World War II. The scion of a political family -- his great-grandfather was Speaker of the House of Representatives, and his grandfather was prime minister -- Hatoyama studied engineering in both Japan and the United States, earning his Ph.D. from Stanford University. He once appeared to be headed for an academic career but then entered politics, in 1986, on the Liberal Democratic Party's ticket. In 1993, he co-founded the first Democratic Party of Japan, an opposition party that later absorbed or merged with several other parties to form today's DPJ. In the general election last summer, the DPJ's main foreign policy pledges included paying more attention to Japan's neighbors and withdrawing the Japanese ships in the Indian Ocean supporting the war in Afghanistan. Although the Hatoyama cabinet has already suffered a political scandal (involving illegal campaign-funding practices), the DPJ and its allies hold sufficient votes in both houses of parliament to retain power for a full four-year term.
But the U.S. government has been slow to adapt to the new political horizon in Tokyo. Hatoyama appears to want to reduce the U.S. footprint in Japan. In November 1996, he wrote in the monthly Bungei Shunju that the security treaty should be renegotiated to eliminate the peacetime presence of U.S. troops and bases in Japan by 2010. Hatoyama's political philosophy includes a vague concept of yuai (brotherhood) among neighboring nations. And at times he has spoken of forming an East Asian community that would exclude the United States. Americans who know him are quick to assert, however, that he is not anti-American but he believes in a more equal relationship.
The size and impact of the U.S. military footprint in Japan today is almost surely going to be a bone of contention in the months and years ahead. There are still some 85 facilities housing 44,850 U.S. military personnel and 44,289 dependents. Close to 75 percent of the troops are based in Okinawa, an island a little less than one-third the size of Long Island. Their presence is a continuing aggravation to local residents. In 2008, Okinawa Prefecture alone reported 28 airplane accidents, six cases of water pollution from oil waste, 18 uncontrolled land fires, and 70 felonies. And this is to say nothing of the emergence of red-light districts near the bases. U.S. military authorities are quick to point out that the crimes committed by U.S. soldiers can happen anywhere and that they occur at the hands of U.S. troops at the same rate as among comparable cohorts. This is beside the point, however: the Japanese who read reports of such crimes are wondering if the benefits of having foreign troops in their country outweigh the costs.
One particularly galling issue for the Japanese is the matter of "host nation support," or "the sympathy budget," which amounts to between $3 billion and $4 billion per year. Back in 1978, when it was eager to head off criticism from Washington for its mounting trade surpluses, the Japanese government agreed to pay for many of the labor costs of the 25,000 Japanese working on U.S. bases. Twenty percent of those workers, it turns out, provide entertainment and food services: a recent list drawn up by the Japanese Ministry of Defense included 76 bartenders, 48 vending machine personnel, 47 golf course maintenance personnel, 25 club managers, 20 commercial artists, 9 leisure-boat operators, 6 theater directors, 5 cake decorators, 4 bowling alley clerks, 3 tour guides, and 1 animal caretaker. As one DPJ Diet member, Shu Watanabe, put it, "Why does Japan need to pay the costs for U.S. service members' entertainment on their holidays?"
HAM-HANDED DIPLOMACY
Soon after a 12-year-old Japanese schoolgirl was raped by two U.S. marines and a U.S. sailor in 1995, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry set in motion a plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The two governments worked out an implementation agreement in 2006. But rather than help resolve the problem, the deal triggered the first clash between Hatoyama and U.S. President Barack Obama.
One might have expected the two new administrations to hit it off admirably. Both Hatoyama and Obama came to power repudiating their predecessors and calling for change. For the past ten years, polls have consistently shown that more than 72 percent of Japanese view the United States favorably and that 80 percent of Americans consider Japan to be a trusted ally. Last fall, Obama's popularity in Japan exceeded 80 percent; Japanese readers have been snapping up his autobiography and collected speeches.
But both leaders have been extraordinarily ham-handed in their initial dealings. One issue involves the Futenma Marine Corps air base, in the town of Ginowan, in Okinawa, whose 80,000 residents are disturbed every few minutes by the deafening sound of U.S. aircraft taking off and landing. Under the 2006 agreement to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Japan, the Futenma base was to be relocated to the less populated Okinawan town of Nago, and some 8,000 marines and their dependents were to be transferred to Guam. The U.S. government demanded that Japan pay for a large portion of the moves' expenses. But Tokyo has repeatedly called for more time to study alternatives to the plan, and Hatoyama has said that Japan would not decide its position until May 2010.
Hatoyama is in a difficult position. His partners in the Social Democratic Party want the Futenma base out of Japan entirely and have threatened to leave the ruling coalition if the 2006 agreement is implemented. But he needs their support in the upper house, at least until July, when an election is scheduled to take place. Other opponents of the 2006 agreement argue that relocating the Futenma base to Nago could harm the coral reefs offshore and thus the future of the local tourist industry.
Okinawa is Japan's poorest prefecture; its history and culture are distinct from those of the rest of country, and its inhabitants feel like second-class citizens. They recall that Okinawa bore the brunt of the U.S. invasion of April 1945, and many believe that at the time the Japanese army forced Japanese soldiers to commit suicide en masse rather than surrender to the Americans. In a poll of Okinawan residents taken in November 2009, more than 52 percent of the respondents favored consolidating and reducing the number of U.S. bases in Japan, and more than 31 percent favored removing all the U.S. bases completely. Just under 12 percent wished to maintain the status quo, presumably because of the employment opportunities and rent that the U.S. presence provides them.
The U.S. military has largely treated Okinawa as its own fiefdom since 1945. Some 12,500 Americans died and 37,000 were wounded in the battle for the island. Until it officially reverted to Japan, in 1972, the U.S. military ran the place with a free hand, often defying the wishes of both the Japanese government and the U.S. State Department. In one incident, in 1966, the U.S. military secretly transported nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Honshu, Japan's main island, in flagrant violation of the 1960 agreement. The U.S. military also resisted Okinawa's reversion, and it continues to have a proprietary attitude about what goes on there.
Some knowledgeable observers, both American and Japanese, in government and not, believe that one good solution would be to combine the Futenma Marine air base with the U.S. Air Force base at Kadena, in an area that is less populated than Ginowan. But interservice rivalry stands in the way: the Marine Corps wants its own base. Other observers have asked, pointedly, why the U.S. Marines are in Okinawa in the first place. What threat is it that they would counter? But instead of answering such questions or addressing Hatoyama's concerns, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates showed up in Tokyo in October to demand that the 2006 agreement be implemented.
THE ROAR OF BLUNDERS
Washington should have given the new Hatoyama government more time to sort out its position on the issue of the Futenma base. More generally, the U.S. government should be celebrating the electoral victory of a strong second party in Japan as evidence that the seeds of democracy, which the U.S. government helped sow, have taken root. Doing so would mean no longer expecting Japan to meekly follow orders from the Pentagon. And it would mean recognizing the right of Japanese political parties to hold their own views on security matters. It is time for the White House and the State Department to reassert civilian control over U.S. policy toward Japan, especially over military matters. It was foolish for the Pentagon to try to bully Hatoyama just one month after he came to power into carrying out an agreement that the previous Japanese government had made with the Bush administration.
A wiser course would be to adopt what the Japanese call teishisei, "low posture." Washington and Tokyo should engage in a deliberate reconsideration of the entire range of issues raised by the security treaty. If there are strong strategic arguments for keeping the U.S. Marines in Okinawa, they should be aired publicly so that the Japanese people can decide if they are persuasive. The matter of the Futenma base is only a small part of the equation.
The U.S. government should respect Japan's desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on its territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines. It should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, which to some is redolent of nineteenth-century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be aware that, at the end of the day, Japanese voters will determine the future course of the alliance. Above all, U.S. negotiators should start with the premise that the security treaty with Japan, important as it is, is only part of a larger partnership between two of the world's greatest democracies and economies. Washington stands to gain far more by working with Tokyo on the environment, health issues, human rights, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism.
In return for the removal of some U.S. troops and bases from its territory, the Japanese government should make far larger contributions to mutual security and global peace. It should explicitly state that it has the right to engage in operations of collective self-defense. Tokyo would be foolish to establish a community of East Asian nations without U.S. participation. It needs to work with Washington in the six-party talks on how to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government should also stop protecting its uncompetitive agricultural sector and join in a free-trade agreement with the United States, an idea that has been kicking around for two decades and that the DPJ endorsed in its election manifesto.
Finally, in a grand symbolic gesture, President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama should visit Hiroshima together after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Japan next fall and should issue a resounding call to end the manufacture and spread of nuclear weapons, a cause close to the hearts of both men. Then, they should visit Pearl Harbor and declare that no such attack should ever be carried out again. Such gestures could help finally soothe the wounds of war and cement U.S.-Japanese relations for decades to come.
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Japan: Let Them Defend Themselves
Unlike nearly everyone in Japan and the rest of Asia, Americans want Japan to spend more on its military, thinking that will equalize economic competition. It won't
by James Fallows
AMERICA'S biggest delusion about Japan is that the "free ride" on defense that we give Japan is the key to the two countries' problems. If we can only make the Japanese pay for their own protection, many Americans feel, our economic difficulties will work themselves out.
Last fall, before he was nominated as Secretary of Defense, John Tower told a Japanese interviewer what he later said during his confirmation hearings: that Japan should change its Constitution if that's what it would take to start spending more on defense. In its past session the U.S. Congress passed a resolution demanding that Japan spend three percent of its gross national product on defense, as opposed to the roughly one percent it spends now (and to the seven percent the United States spends). "Our European partners spend about three percent," an aide to Representative Duncan Hunter, of California, who sponsored the resolution, said early this year. "It's entirely reasonable to expect Japan to do the same." Last year Representative Patricia Schroeder, of Colorado, recommended a "defense protection fee" on all Japanese imports, to make the connection between our protection and their prosperity as bluntly explicit as it can be: for each car the Japanese bring into America, they would have to cover some of the cost of the American ships and planes that guard Japan. Otherwise, why should the United States, with its huge deficits, keep paying to protect a country whose surpluses pile up by the day?
Discuss this article in the Global Views forum of Post & Riposte.
Behind these proposals, and the broader public grumbling about Japan's "free ride," is the idea that America's economy has been hobbled by defense spending, so in all fairness Japan's should be hobbled too. Or, to put it more pleasantly, that Japan should take up some of America's burden, so that the two economies can compete on a fairer and more equal basis. However it may be phrased, the essential idea is that Japan has been imposing on our good will for just about long enough. Who won the war, anyway? If the Japanese don t back off from their aggressive trading practices, we will have to teach them a lesson by withdrawing some of the military protection we magnanimously provide.
I think this concept has things exactly the wrong way around. The military relationship between Japan and America, "free ride" and all, is much better for each party than any alternative I've heard suggested so far. The division of labor is complicated and obviously unequal -- even if Japan is paying more and more of the cost of defending its own home territory, it has nothing like America's worldwide military costs. Still, it sounds easier to correct the imbalance, by "making" Japan pay its way, than it turns out to be when you look at the details. We can do ourselves a favor if we concentrate on our real disagreements with Japan, about trade policy, and forget about the "free ride."
Before getting into the details, let's step back to consider how much damage the defense imbalance does, and how the United States got itself in this bind. Of course the difference between the Japanese and American defense budgets is enormous, and is a significant economic problem for the United States. Some Japanese officials have recently been trying to convince people that the imbalance is not as large as it seems. After all, they point out, Japan is now overtaking Britain and has the third-largest military budget in the world, which sounds about right for a country with the world's second-largest economy. "Third-largest," however, is completely misleading, because it reflects little more than the enormous increase in the value of the yen. In 1985 Japan's defense budget was the eighth largest in the world, comparable to those of such questionable powers as Italy and Poland. Since then the budget as measured in yen has gone up steadily but modestly, in pace with the Japanese economy as a whole -- from about 3.1 trillion yen in 1985 to about 3.7 trillion in 1988. As measured in dollars, however, the budget zoomed upward by more than 200 percent in those same three years. Because international budget comparisons are still made in dollars, it's the exchange rate, rather than a real defense buildup, that has propelled Japan toward the top of the charts. Even at these inflated dollar-yen rates, Japan's defense spending is about one tenth of America's, roughly $30 billion a year versus roughly $300 billion. If we use NATO's system of measuring defense budgets, which includes (as Japan's does not) military pensions and other costs in the total, Japan's spending comes to about 1.7 percent of its GNP. This is still much less than that of any major Western country. In terms of the burden the country imposes on itself, Japan has at most the twentieth-largest military budget in the world.
U.S. industry is handicapped in a further way, relative to Japan's. When American military interests have collided with the interests of American companies, U.S. policy has favored the military. It is more convenient for American commanders, for example, if allied nations all use similar equipment. Therefore the Pentagon has willingly licensed advanced weapons technology to NATO countries, Korea, and Japan, so that they can build compatible equipment for themselves. The F-15s that are the backbone of Japan's air force are manufactured in Japan, under license from McDonnell Douglas. This approach, of course, erodes America's technical lead and in many cases has spawned direct competition in the arms business.
Japan's bias has been just the opposite of America's. Its military commanders would be much better off if Japan imported its weapons, rather than building them domestically in small, costly production runs. But, unlike the United States, Japan can put commercial interests over military ones, so it spends 90 percent of its procurement money at home. Last year Japan faced a black-and-white choice between military efficiency and promotion of its own industry, when it selected a new fighter plane for its air force. Every factor except industrial promotion pointed toward one decision: buying the F-16 fighter plane from the United States. The F-16 was available immediately, it was battle-tested, and it was comparatively cheap. This is one case in which every normal market standard favored the U.S.-made product.
And yet Japan attempted for as long as possible to design and build an entirely new airplane, all its own, as an entry to one of the few industries in which it is still behind. The U.S. government was indignant about these plans. Japan eventually threw us a sop, by agreeing to accept the blueprints and technical specifications for the F-16, and, after modifying the wings and radar and certain other parts, to build the new "FSX" planes in Japan, with some American subcontracting. Japan's military will suffer from this deal. The planes won't be ready until the middle of the next decade, and they will cost about twice as much as F-16s. But Japanese industry will, for the first time, have the experience of putting together a modern plane from drawing-board to final assembly.
THE FSX deal is, as The New York Times said in an uncharacteristically sharp-tongued editorial, "one-sided and unfair." But does it, or any other part of the military-spending imbalance, mean that the United Suites can eliminate its burden by changing its military relationship with Japan? Unfortunately, it does not. In principle, Japan could solve the "free ride" problem in either of two ways. It could spend much more on its own defense, or it could pay more of America's costs -- essentially hiring the United States for Pacific defense. The United States will have a very hard time persuading Japan to do either.
The first approach -- putting pressure on Japan to expand its own military -- would be wildly unpopular in Japan and everywhere else in Asia. Japan and its neighbors remember the Second World War in different ways, but the memory leaves all of them hostile to the idea of a strongly re-armed Japan.
It is hard for most Americans to imagine how deep is the fear of Japanese rearmament that spreads across the rest of Asia -- and that persists in Japan as well. Someone who had never opened a history book might look at today's Japan and conclude that the fear was completely absurd. This is about as civilian-looking and nonmilitarized a society as you will find. True, many parts of Japanese life do seem regimented and quasi-military. But these are the civilian parts: the industries, where workers do calisthenics beneath snapping company flags, with martial music booming through the air; the schools, where boys wear shorts all through the winter to show that they are tough. The fierceness and esprit in the military itself cannot compare. There are some 250,000 soldiers in the jieitai (literally, "self-defense force," rather than "army"), but they're practically invisible. Soldiers refuse to wear their uniforms in public; they commute in civilian clothes and change once they get to work. In any case, the uniforms seem bus-conductor-like and deliberately nonmartial, especially by comparison with the severe Prussian-style outfits worn by high school students.
Japan's equivalent of the Pentagon is situated near the Roppongi stop on Tokyo's subway, in a chic tourist and nightclub district. If you ride the Washington, D.C., Metro to the Pentagon stop, you will see uniformed soldiers by the hundreds; I have never seen a uniform in the Roppongi crowds. The Defense Agency proudly releases polls showing that Japanese people have a favorable impression of the military. But according to these same polls, 77 percent of the Japanese public think that the military's most valuable function has been to clean up after typhoons and provide other forms of disaster relief.
In today's Japan of Sony and Toyota, joining the military is a very unfashionable career move and the jieitai has a harder and harder time attracting recruits. It is about 30,000 soldiers below the level authorized by Japanese policy, and there are relatively few people in the reserves.
The army would be in terrible trouble if it were not for the southern island of Kyushu, which contains only about an eighth of Japan's people but seems (judging by the soldiers I've met) to produce most of its recruits. In Kyushu, which has a long history of famous warrior clans, I have heard families say that they wanted their sons to grow up to be soldiers or sailors, but not anywhere else. Three years ago I interviewed cadets at the National Defense Academy, in Yokosuka, where future officers are trained. I asked them why they had chosen careers in the military. The ones who weren't from Kyushu often gave answers like "failed my exams for Todai" (the hallowed University of Tokyo) and "wanted a free education."
There is an air of unseriousness about Japan's military undertakings, which is especially noticeable by comparison with the deadly earnestness of everything else. Soldiers are officially just another kind of government employee: there is no court-martial system, no penalty for refusing to join the military after getting a free education at the academy, no system of emergency laws empowering the military to do what it must for national security. At the Japanese air-force base in Okinawa an officer was giving me a lecture about the supersensitive "hot scramble hangars," where F-4 fighters wait to intercept the Soviet planes that fly close to Japanese air space every two or three days. Just as he finished warning me not to get too close or take any pictures, an All Nippon Airways jumbo jet taxied by, full of vacationers gawking out the windows at the hangars. At Okinawa, as at the other major Japanese air-force base -- Chitose, on the northern island of Hokkaido -- the air force has to share runway space with, and be bossed around by, the civilian airlines. Political "debates" about defense usually begin and end with statistics. "Discussions in the Diet are always and only about the 'one percent limit,'" says Motoo Shiina, one of the rare politicians known as an expert on defense. "You can sulk about one percent for an hour, pro or con, but you shouldn't talk about anything else."
THERE are many explanations for Japan's nonchalance about the military. The most obvious is Article IX of its postwar Constitution, drafted in English by General Douglas MacArthur's occupation experts and translated into stilted Japanese. Contrary to general belief in the United States, this "Peace Constitution" does not set a ceiling on Japanese defense spending. The "limit" of one percent was in fact merely a policy guideline adopted "for the time being" by the Cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976. Eleven years later, under Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan broke the limit when its spending reached 1.004 percent of GNP. The change was more significant than the tiny violation might suggest. For one thing, Nakasone's government presented a Midterm Defense Program, which outlined the new equipment the military would buy from 1986 to 1990. Such plans had existed before, but this was the first one backed up by real money. The government committed 18 trillion yen (about $150 billion at current rates) to be spent on the military over five years, at a time when most domestic spending was being reduced. This should be enough to buy all the weapons listed in the plan, and enough to keep defense spending slightly above one percent of GNP. Also, this move was an attempt to move Japanese defense discussions away from the one-percent obsession, so that budgets could be based on what the military actually needed. In principle, the government now sets budgets without worrying about the limit, but in practice, anything above one percent creates intense political resistance in Japan.
Rather than limiting defense spending, Article IX of the Constitution prohibits it altogether -- or so it seems, if the original English version is taken at face value. "Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained," it says, because Japan "forever renounce[s]" resorting to armed force as a sovereign right. Japan has worked its way toward its current sizable military force through a series of judicial and political "reinterpretations" of the Constitution. The crucial legal concept has been the idea that no nation can renounce the right to defend itself against attack, much as no individual is allowed to sell himself into slavery. Until 1950 MacArthur's policy discouraged Japan from developing an armed force of any sort. But as American soldiers were called away to Korea, MacArthur ordered Japan to establish a National Police Reserve, comprising some 75,000 men, which later evolved into the Ground Self-Defense Force.
Some Japanese intellectuals contend that the half-serious, bastard nature of the jieitai is spiritually bad for the country. Shuichi Kato, a renowned leftist literary critic, was staunchly against the Vietnam War and is always alert for signs of renascent militarism in Japan. But when I first met him, in 1986, he said, "And yet you cannot deny that Americans were risking their lives in Vietnam for something they believed. Japan is not asked to do that now." Hideaki Kase, from the opposite end of Japan's political spectrum, says essentially the same thing. Kase, best known for his veneration of Japan's imperial family, says, "We have been playing a very profitable game of posing as unconscientious objectors. We base our defense policy not on preparation against a hostile threat from the Russians but on the need to placate the Americans." In contrast, Masataka Kosaka, a professor at Kyoto University who is known as one of Japan's few "defense intellectuals," says that Japan's military has a spiritual advantage over those of most other countries. In the age of nuclear weapons, he says, fewer and fewer armies from major countries will actually fight, and yet somehow they must maintain morale. Japan's army has lived with this predicament for more than thirty years, he says, and it will set the model for armies of the twenty-first century.
Whether the hazy legality of the jieitai is good or bad for Japan, it indicates Japan's lack of interest in expanding its military. Public-opinion polls in Japan show overwhelming resistance to increases in defense spending. (In a recent poll 80 percent of respondents favored keeping spending at or below the current level of one percent.) Moreover, Japan's peculiar way of remembering the Second World War intensifies the resistance to re-arming. Japan is not exactly guilt-ridden about its role in the war -- the Peace Memorial Museum, in Hiroshima, for instance, begins its historical narrative with the American firebombing of Tokyo in the spring of 1945, with no mention of any preceding unpleasantness. But Japan seems unanimously and permanently convinced that the war led to catastrophe for the country. Moreover, the prevalent view in Japan is that the war was caused by a clique of semi-crazed militarists, who seized control of the country and forced everyone else into what was clearly a suicidal undertaking. This attitude is tremendously irritating to Chinese or Koreans who are looking for signs of personal contrition from the Japanese, but it actually makes for a very durable kind of anti-militarism -- one based on self-interest. "The war created lasting suspicion of the military, but not because we made other people suffer," Shuichi Kato says. "The memory of the war is that we suffered so much." Most mature Japanese can remember the utter ruin of the postwar years; they blame General Tojo and his cronies for it, and they don't want the military to have another chance.
In the rest of Asia there is more of an edge to memories of Japan's wartime role. As I've listened to officials -- in China, especially -- warn about the danger of a militarized Japan, I've suspected that their fears were partly put on for effect. Japan's war record is one of its few vulnerabilities, and these warnings are a way to get America's attention. Still, I've heard the warnings in every neighboring country (except Burma, where the Japanese are generally viewed as liberators who kicked out the British), and for the most part the apprehension seems sincere. Throughout Asia the least popular American trend is the apparent enthusiasm for big Japanese defense spending. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, has warned for years about the dangers of Japanese re-armament, although recently he has started saying that a bigger Japanese military is inevitable and that the crucial thing is for it to keep working as a junior partner to the Americans. "As long as our military seems firmly under the guidance of the Americans, the rest of Asia will not worry too much," says Masashi Nishihara, a professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy. "If we ever went off independently, everyone would be afraid."
In short, deeply felt emotions in Japan and throughout the rest of Asia put a low ceiling on Japan's potential military spending. Long before the defense budget increased enough to hobble the Japanese economy, it would have provoked some political reaction from China and South Korea, and probably the Soviet Union as well. (Exactly what kind of reaction is impossible to say, but it certainly couldn't leave northeast Asia as free of major conflict as it has been since the Korean Wan) But there is a further limit on Japan's spending: it is hard to see what Japan could spend a lot of extra money for.
THE question of "enough" is hard for any country considering its national defense to resolve, but it is particularly baffling for Japan's military. In theory, Japan could cut its military budget to zero and still feel more or less secure, relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and on the knowledge that no one has dared invade the home islands of Japan since the time of Kublai Khan. Or Japan could equally well decide that its national-security interests extend to every ship that brings in raw materials or carries out exports; in that case, Japan would need to build the world's biggest navy to defend itself completely.
In practice, Japan has defined "enough" by taking on, one after another, jobs that America has handed it during the past two decades. Its military now has three main missions: to be ready to defend the northern island of Hokkaido against a Russian assault; to be able to seal up the crucial straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima, through which the Soviet navy must pass to get from Vladivostok to the open sea, and in general to erect air and sea defenses that will keep the Soviet military bottled up in Siberia in time of war; and to patrol the commercial shipping lanes leading southward from Japan toward the Philippines and the Straits of Malacca. In principle, this means that Japan is now completely responsible for defending itself with conventional weapons against a conventional attack. The U.S. military's part of the bargain is to provide a nuclear deterrent and, through the destroyers and aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet, to do the kind of long-range "power projection" that no Asians want the Japanese to undertake.
Japan's assignments are somewhat vague and open-ended. For instance, the responsibility for defending sea lanes, since 1981 mainly against Soviet submarines, has included a thousand-mile stretch. But exactly how the Japanese will divide this labor with the United States, and how much sea power they will deploy, is unclear. What is clear is that Japan is well on its way to having a big enough army to do its jobs, even at its current "free ride" budget levels. Under the current Midterm Defense Program, Japan is supposed to increase its force of F-15 fighters to 700, and modernize its 100 F-4s. It will replace its older Nike anti-aircraft missiles with Patriot missiles, increase the number of its P-3C anti-submarine aircraft from 50 to 100, and build 10 new destroyer-type surface ships. Even during the Reagan-era military buildup the U.S. inventory of most major weapons shrank, because the cost of weapons rose faster than the budget. For the next few years Japan will be the only major military power in the world that is buying new weapons and at the same time expanding the size of its force. Japanese military officials often say that their forces are small and humble, but most other defense authorities I've interviewed here say that Japan has no urgent need for new hardware which implementing the Midterm Defense Program won't meet.
Japan's military still has some glaring weaknesses. According to U.S. observers, it has never laid in adequate supplies of ammunition, fuel, or spare parts. "They better hope the first volley holds off the Russians," an American military officer says. "They've barely got one reload of missiles." Also, the three branches of the Japanese military are even more uncoordinated and prone to backbiting than the branches of America's are. When a Japan Air Lines jumbo jet crashed in the mountains outside Tokyo in 1985, the rescuers reached the site twelve hours late, in part because the air force, the army, various police forces, and other government agencies were trying to decide who should do what in the rescue effort. The survivors reported that several other people were alive after the crash but died during the night, while the branches of the jieitai spun their wheels. "This delay cost several lives," says Masataka Kosaka, of Kyoto University. "In wartime such behavior would be catastrophic."
Despite such problems, many serious military analysts conclude that Japan is smoothly moving toward "enough." Shunji Taoka, a veteran defense writer for Japan's most prestigious newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, has prepared a dense analysis showing that the Soviet Union lacks the troop carriers and transport planes to overwhelm Japanese defenses during a surprise attack on Hokkaido. Moreover, he says, the Soviet Far Eastern fleet is sure to weaken over the next decade, because its ships are aging faster than they are being replaced. "Japan exercises the responsibility for its own non-nuclear defense," Michael Armacost told me shortly before he was nominated to succeed Mike Mansfield as the U.S. ambassador to Japan. "Japan already possesses substantially more destroyers than we deploy in the Seventh Fleet; it has a larger force of surveillance aircraft than we maintain in the Pacific; it has nearly as many fighter aircraft defending its territory as we have defending the continental United States. This is a significant force and provides solid protection."
Japan can undoubtedly go much further toward having "enough." One executive of an American defense contractor, based in Tokyo, says that he has a vision of "porcupine Japan," bristling with cruise missiles and electronic air-defense systems that protect it against attack without threatening any of its neighbors. Japan can also, and will, increase its foreign-aid payments, which is a subject for another time. But -- to get back to the main point -- nothing in Japan's internal politics, its relations with its neighbors, or its military plans will make it spend enough money to weaken its economy as that of the United States is now weakened.
THAT leaves the other possibility -- forcing Japan to shoulder some of America's military costs. Americans imagine that they have tremendous leverage against Japan on this point: Pay up or we'll leave you exposed. This, however, would be an undignified position for America to take. Worse, it wouldn't work.
As long as the United States remains a military power in the Pacific, it needs Japan's cooperation at least as much as Japan needs U.S. protection. I mean cooperation not in some abstract sense but as a practical matter of where the United States can station its troops and dock its ships. In West Germany and South Korea, American troops are stationed largely near the front, to guarantee that they'd be involved if fighting began. But there is not a single United States soldier in Hokkaido, the most likely invasion site in Japan (to the extent that any site is likely). Of the 55,000 U.S. soldiers and sailors in Japan, two thirds are based in Okinawa, a thousand miles southwest of Tokyo, where they are mainly a swing force to be used in Korea or elsewhere in Asia. The other major concentrations include a U.S. Air Force base in Misawa, in northern Japan, the closest of all American bases to the imposing Soviet military centers on Sakhalin Island; the naval base at Yokosuka, a crucial dry-dock and refitting site for the U.S. Seventh Fleet; Army facilities at Zama and a naval air installation at Atsugi, both near Tokyo; and a Marine air base at Iwakuni, near Hiroshima. "We are not being honest...when we talk as though American overseas military deployments have been essentially altruistic -- not for ourselves but for our allies," Martin Weinstein, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., said in congressional testimony last fall. The real problem for America is not that it has to keep bases in Japan but that it might lose them, according to Dennis J. Doolin, a former Pentagon official who specialized in U.S.-Japanese relations. "We are...in a logistically ideal strategic posture in Northeast Asia," Doolin has written, "and we had better learn to appreciate this fact and stop complaining....Japan's contribution is enormous, unique, irreplaceable, and invaluable."
Moreover, Japan already bears more of the cost of the American troops stationed on its territory than does any other allied country. Its program of "host-country support" covers about 40 percent of the roughly $6 billion cost of keeping American soldiers there, and the Japanese-paid proportion is increasing every year. (Japan says that under its Constitution and its-Status of Forces Agreement with the United States it can't pay the salaries of American soldiers or direct military operating costs, like those for fuel and supplies. It is gradually taking over most other costs.) The presence of foreign troops creates inevitable irritations: think how Americans would feel if, instead of "buying up America" in some theoretical way, the Japanese had soldiers in Chicago and aircraft carriers cruising through the Golden Gate. The Japanese government goes out of its way to deflect resentment of the United States. For instance, when some trees in a diminutive forest were cut down last year to make way for new U.S. military housing, creating a huge controversy, the Defense Agency made clear that Japan's government, not America's, had authorized the project. Just about everything Japan can do for the American military in Japan it is already doing or getting ready to do.
The one big exception to Japan's generally cooperative approach is -- surprise -- its weapons-buying policy. Each time Japan insists on industrial-strategy projects like the FSX, -- it feeds all the worst suspicions about its sense of balance and fair play. But these disputes should be thought of the way the Japanese think of them -- as trade disputes, not military ones. Japan could ease trade frictions, while getting twice as many weapons for its money, if it bought planes and missiles directly from the United States, rather than building them at home. But this will be one of the last areas Japan opens to imports. Japanese officials are quite candid about their determination to develop their own aircraft industry and in general to use military contracts for industrial development. They are less candid about exports of military equipment, which now occur on a small scale and could increase, because the main barrier to them is not Japan's Constitution but its fear of international reaction. Last summer the Tokyo office of Warburg Securities released an influential report on Japan's nascent arms industries, including strong "buy," recommendations for major defense contractors such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan Aircraft Manufacturing, and Fuji Heavy Industries.
Where does this leave America? With little bargaining power to use over Japan in military matters -- and little reason to use it. Japan is happier for having the United States as the big military power in the Pacific, so is the rest of Asia, and so is the United States. Every strategic and military trend in the area is favorable to American interests. There are no wars under way outside Indochina; most countries are becoming richer, freer, and more democratic. The only "threat" most Asian countries pose to the United States is through economic competition. Much of what is right in Asia is right because of the U.S. military presence, which has helped Japan to flourish peacefully and has kept everyone else from worrying about Japan. It would be shortsighted to upset this arrangement just to solve some trade problems. Trade problems are better dealt with on their own.
Copyright © 1989 by James Fallows. All rights reserved.
The Atlantic Monthly; April 1989; Japan: Let them Defend Themselves; Volume 264, No. 4; pages 34 - 38.
Russia and China Striking the United States where it hurts. Part 1
"Russia will also utilize the manpower of China as they make their thrust forward. I realize, My child, that this message has a great emotional impact upon you. Do not be afeared." - Jesus, March 26, 1983
From Asia Times Online Oct 19, 2006:
AMERICA'S ACUPUNCTURE POINTS
PART 1: Striking the US where it hurts
A noted Chinese theorist on modern warfare, Chang Mengxiong, compared China's form of fighting to "a Chinese boxer with a keen knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movements". It is like key acupuncture points in ancient Chinese medicine. Puncture one vital point and the whole anatomy is affected. If America ever goes to war with China, say, over Taiwan, then America should be prepared for the following "acupuncture points" in its anatomy to be "punctured". Each of the vital points can bring America to its knees with a minimum of effort.
1.) Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP) attack
China and Russia are two potential US adversaries that have the capability for this kind of attack. An EMP attack can either come from an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a long-range cruise missile, or an orbiting satellite armed with a nuclear or non-nuclear EMP warhead. A nuclear burst of one (or more) megaton some 400 kilometers over central United States (Omaha, Nebraska) can blanket the whole continental US with electro-magnetic pulse in less than one second.
An EMP attack will damage all electrical grids on the US mainland. It will disable computers and other similar electronic devices with microchips. Most businesses and industries will shut down. The entire US economy will practically grind to a halt. Satellites within line of sight of the EMP burst will also be damaged, adversely affecting military command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles will be rendered unserviceable in their silos. Anti-ballistic missile defenses will suffer the same fate. In short – total blackout. And American society as we know it will be thrown back to the Dark Ages.
Of course, the US may decide to strike first, but China and Russia now have the means of striking back with submarine-launched ballistic missiles with the same or even more devastating results. But knowing China's strategy of "active defense", when war with the US becomes imminent, China will surely not allow itself to be targeted first. It will seize the initiative as mandated by its doctrine by striking first.
China has repeatedly announced that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But as an old Chinese saying goes: "There can never be too much deception in war." If it means the survival of the whole Chinese nation that is at stake, China will surely not allow a public statement to tie its hands and prevent it from seizing the initiative. As another saying goes: "All is fair in love and war."
2.) Cyber attack
America is the most advanced country in the world in the field of information technology (IT). Practically all of its industries, manufacturing, business and finance, telecommunications, key government services and defense establishment rely heavily on computers and computer networks.
But this heavy dependence on computers is a double-edged sword. It has thrust the US economy and defense establishment ahead of all other countries; but it has also created an Achilles' heel that can potentially bring the superpower to its knees with a few keystrokes on a dozen or so laptops.
China's new concept of a "people's war" includes IT warriors coming, not only from its military more than 2-million strong, but from the general citizenry of some 1.3 billion people. If we add the hackers and information warriors from Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria and other countries sympathetic to China, the cyber attack on the US would be formidable indeed.
So, if a major conflict erupts between China and America, more than a few dozen laptops will be engaged to hack America's military establishment; banking system; stock exchange; defense industries; telecommunication system; power grids; water system; oil and gas pipeline system; air traffic and train traffic control systems; C4ISR system, ballistic missile system, and other systems that prop up the American way of life.
America, on the whole, has not adequately prepared itself for this kind of attack. Neither has it prepared itself for a possible EMP attack. Such attacks can bring a superpower like America to its knees with a minimum of movement.
3.) Interdiction of US foreign oil supply
America is now 75% dependent on foreign imported oil. About 23.5% of America's imported oil supply comes from the Persian Gulf. To cut off this oil supply, Iran can simply mine the Strait of Hormuz, using bottom-rising sea mines. It is worthwhile to note that Iran has the world's fourth-largest inventory of sea mines, after China, Russia and the US.
Combined with sea mines, Iran can also block the narrow strait with supersonic cruise missiles such as Yakhonts, Moskits, Granits and Brahmos deployed on Abu Musa Island and all along the rugged and mountainous coastline of Iran fronting the Persian Gulf. This single action can bring America to its knees. Not only America but Japan (which derives 90% of its oil supply) and Europe (which derives about 60% of its oil supply from the Persian Gulf ) will be adversely affected.
In the event of a major conflict involving superpower America and its allies (primarily Japan and Britain) on the one hand and China and its allies (primarily Russia and Iran) on the other, Iran's role will become strategically crucial. Iran can totally stop the flow of oil coming from the Persian Gulf. This is the main reason why China and Russia are carefully nurturing intimate economic, cultural, political, diplomatic and military ties with Iran, which at one time was condemned by US President George W Bush as belonging to that "axis of evil", along with Iraq and North Korea.
This is also the reason why Iran is so brave in daring the US to attack it on the nuclear proliferation issue. Iran knows that it has the power to hurt the US. Without oil from the Gulf, the war machines of the US and its principal allies will literally run out of gas.
A single blow from Iran or China or Russia, or a combination of the three at the Strait of Hormuz can paralyze America. In addition, Chinese and Russian submarines can stop the flow of oil to the US and Japan by interdicting oil tanker traffic coming from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. On the other hand, US naval supremacy will have minimal effect on China's oil supply because it is already connected to Kazakhstan with a pipeline and will soon be connected to Russia and Iran as well.
One wonders: what will be the price of oil if Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz. It will surely drive oil prices sky high. Prolonged high oil prices can, in turn, trigger inflation in the US and a sharp decline of the dollar, possibly even a dollar free-fall. The collapse of the dollar will have a serious impact on the entire US economy.
This brings us to the next "acupuncture point" in the US anatomy: dollar vulnerability.
4.) Attack on the US dollar
One of the pillars propping up US superpower status and worldwide economic dominance is the dollar being accepted as the predominant reserve currency. Central banks of various countries have to stock up dollar reserves because they can only buy their oil requirements and other major commodities in US dollars.
This US economic strength, however, is a double-edged sword and can turn out to be America's economic Achilles' heel. A run of the US dollar, for instance, which would cause a dollar free-fall, can bring the entire US economy toppling down.
What is frightening for the US is the fact that China, Russia and Iran possess the power to cause a run on the US dollar and force its collapse.
China is now the biggest holder of foreign exchange reserves in the world, accumulating $941 billion as of June 30 and expected to exceed a trillion dollars by the end of 2006 - a first in world history. A decision by China to shift a major portion of its reserve to the euro or the yen or gold could trigger other central banks to follow suit. Nobody would want to be left behind holding a bagfull of dollars rapidly turning worthless. The herd psychology would be very difficult to control in this case because national economic survival would be at stake.
This global herd psychology motivated by the survival instinct will be strongly reinforced by the latent anger of many countries in the Middle East, Eurasia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America that silently abhor the pugnacious arrogance displayed by the lone Superpower in the exercise of its unilateral and militaristic foreign policies. They will just be too happy to dump the dollar and watch the lone Superpower squirm and collapse.
The danger of the dollar collapsing is reinforced by the mounting US current account deficit, which sky-rocketed to $900 billion at an annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2005. This figure is 7% of US gross domestic product (GDP), the largest in US history. The current account deficit reflects the imbalance of US imports to its exports. The large imbalance shows that the US economy is losing its competitiveness, with US jobs and incomes suffering as a result.
These record deficits in external trade and current accounts mean that the US has to borrow from foreign lenders (mostly Japan and China) $900 billion annually or nearly $2.5 billion every single day to finance the gap between payments and receipts from the rest of the world. In financial year 2005, $352 billion was spent on interest payment of national debt alone - a national debt that has ballooned to $8.5 trillion as of August 24.
The International Monetary Fund has warned: "The US is on course to increase its net external liabilities to around 40% of its GDP within the next few years - an unprecedented level of external debt for a large industrial country."
The picture of the US federal budget deficit is equally grim. Dennis Cauchon, writing for USA Today said:
The federal government keeps two sets of books. The set the government promotes to the public has a healthier bottom line: a $318 billion deficit in 2005. The set the government doesn't talk about is the audited financial statement produced by the government's accountants following standard accounting rules. It reports a more ominous financial picture: a $760 billion deficit for 2005. If social security and medicare were included - as the board that sets accounting rules is considering - the federal deficit would have been $3.5 trillion. Congress has written its own accounting rules - which would be illegal for a corporation to use because they ignore important costs such as the growing expense of retirement benefits for civil servants and military personnel. Last year, the audited statement produced by the accountants said the government ran a deficit equal to $6,700 for every American household. The number given to the public put the deficit at $2,800 per household ... The audited financial statement - prepared by the Treasury Department - reveals a federal government in far worse financial shape than official budget reports indicate, a USA Today analysis found. The government has run a deficit of $2.9 trillion since 1997, according to the audited number. The official deficit since then is just $729 billion. The difference is equal to an entire year's worth of federal spending.
The huge US current account and trade deficits, the mounting external debt and the ever-increasing federal budget deficits are clear signs of an economy on the edge. They have dragged the dollar to the brink of the precipice. Such a state of economic affairs cannot be sustained for long, and the stability of the dollar is put in grave danger. One push and the dollar will plunge into free-fall. And that push can come from China, Russia or Iran, whom superpower America has been pushing and bullying all along.
We have seen what China can do. How can Russia or Iran, in turn, cause a dollar downfall? On September 2, 2003, Russia and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on oil and gas cooperation. Russia and Saudi Arabia have agreed "to exercise joint control over the dynamics of prices for raw materials on foreign markets". The two biggest oil and gas producers, in cooperation, say, with Iran, could control oil production and sales to keep the price of oil relatively high. Sustained high oil prices, in turn, could trigger a high inflation rate in the US and put extreme pressure on the already weak dollar to trigger a more rapid decline.
Russia is now the world's biggest energy supplier, surpassing Saudi Arabia in energy exports measured in barrel oil equivalent or boe (13.3 million boe per day for Russia vs 10 million boe per day for Saudi Arabia). Russia has the biggest gas reserves in the world. Iran, on the other hand, runs second in the world to Russia in gas reserves, and also ranks among the top oil producers. If and when either Russia or Iran, or both, shift away from a rapidly declining dollar in energy transactions, many oil producers will follow suit. These include Venezuela, Indonesia, Norway, Sudan, Nigeria and the Central Asian Republics.
There is a good chance that even Saudi Arabia and the other oil-exporting countries in the Middle East may follow suit. They wouldn't want to be left with fast-shrinking dollars when the shift from petro-dollar to euro-dollar occurs. Again, the herd psychology will come into play, and the US will eventually be left with a dollar that is practically worthless. Considering the strong anti-American sentiments in the world caused by American unilateralism, especially in the Middle East, a concerted effort to dump the dollar in favor of the euro becomes even more plausible.
When the dollar was removed from the gold standard in August 1971, the dollar gained its strength through its use as the currency of choice in oil transactions. Once the dollar is rejected in favor of the euro or another currency for global oil transactions, the dollar will rapidly lose its value and central banks all over the world will be racing to diversify to other currencies. The shift from petro-dollar to petro-euro will have a devastating effect on the dollar. It could cause the dollar to collapse; and the whole US economy crushing down with it - a scene reminiscent of the collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. But this one will be a thousand times more devastating.
A successful assault on the US dollar will make America crawl on its knees with a minimum of movements. And this assault can come from China, Russia or Iran - or a combination of the three - if they ever decide that they have had enough of US bullying.
5.) Diplomatic isolation
In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed from its own weight, the US emerged as the sole superpower in the world. At that crucial period, it would have been a great opportunity for the US to establish its global leadership and dominance worldwide. With the world's biggest economy, its control of international financial institutions, its huge lead in science and technology (specially information technology) and its unequaled military might, America could have seized the moment to establish a truly American Century.
But in the critical years after 1991, America had to make a choice between two divergent approaches to the use of its almost unlimited power: soft power or hard power. The exercise of soft power would have seen America leading the world in the fight against poverty, disease, drugs, environmental degradation, global warming and other ills plaguing humankind.
It would have pushed America in leading the move to address the debt burden of poor, undeveloped or developing countries; promoting distance learning in remote rural areas to empower the poor economically by providing them access to quality education; and helped poor countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America build highways, railways, ports, airports, hospitals, schools and telecommunication systems.
Unfortunately, such was not to be. If there was any effort at the exercise of soft power at all, it was minimal. In fact, it is not America which is practicing soft power in diplomacy but a rising power in the East - China. China has been busy in the past decade or so exercising soft power in almost all countries in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, winning most of the countries in these regions to its side. Through the use of soft power, China has created a de facto global united front under its silent, low-key leadership.
The US, on the other hand, decided to employ mainly hard power in the exercise of its global power. It adapted the policy of unilateralism and militarism in its foreign policy. It discarded the United Nations and even the advice of close allies. It unilaterally discarded signed international treaties (such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). It adapted the policy of regime change and preventive war. It led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the 78-day bombing of Serbia purportedly for "humanitarian" reasons. It invaded Afghanistan and Iraq without UN sanctions and against the advice of key European allies like France and Germany.
The US-led war in Iraq was a tactical victory for the US initially, but has resulted in strategic defeat overall. The Iraq war caused the US to lose its principal allies in Europe and be isolated, despised and hated in many parts of the world. Without too many friends and allies, the US is likened to an "emperor with no clothes".
So in a major conflict between America and China, isolated America cannot possibly win against a global united front led by China and Russia.
This brings us to the question of alliances, another "acupuncture point" in the anatomy of the superpower, which will be addressed in the second part of this report.
Russia and China Striking the United States with the Assassin's Mace. Part 2
"Russia will also utilize the manpower of China as they make their thrust forward. I realize, My child, that this message has a great emotional impact upon you. Do not be afeared." - Jesus, March 26, 1983
If America ever goes to war with China, Chinese military doctrine suggests the US should expect attacks on a number of key points where it is particularly vulnerable - where a single jab would paralyze the entire nation. China would aim at targets such as the US electricity grid, its computer networks, its oil supply routes, and the dollar. Other vital "acupuncture" points are outlined below.
1.) A powerful triumvirate
No one ever imagined before 1991 that China and Russia would come together to form a close-knit alliance politically, diplomatically and, most important of all, militarily. For more than three decades before the break-up of the Soviet Union, China and the USSR had been bitter rivals, even going into a shooting war with each other along their common border.
But now the picture has changed completely. China and Russia have embraced one another and help each other ward off the military advances of the lone superpower in their respective backyards. In fact, it was a series of strategic blunders by the superpower that forced China and Russia into each other's arms. How so?
When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, it would have been the best time for the US to use soft power to win over Russia into the Western fold. Russia at that time was an economic basket case, with the price of oil at $9 per barrel. But the promises of economic assistance from the US and Europe proved empty, and the Russian oligarchs were the main beneficiaries of relations with the Western powers.
NATO and EU then slowly advanced eastward, absorbing many of the countries making up the former Warsaw Pact alliance. Serbia, a close ally of Russia, was subjected to 78 days of continuous air bombardment. Regime changes were instigated by US and Western-financed non-governmental organizations in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan - all former Soviet republics and considered Russia’s backyard - giving Russia a feeling of strategic encirclement by the US and its allies. There was also the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the establishment of US bases and deployment of troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
These aggressive geopolitical moves by the US pushed Russia into the waiting arms of China, which badly needed Russian energy resources, modern weapon systems and military technology as a consequence of the US-led arms embargo imposed after the Tienanmen incident. Furthermore, China also needed a reliable and militarily capable ally in Russia because of the perceived threat of the US.
Reinforcing this Chinese perception was the outrageously wanton bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by US-led NATO forces in 1999; the spy plane incident in 2001; the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the ABM Treaty in 2002; the enhanced military cooperation between the US and Japan; the inclusion of Taiwan in the Theater Missile Defense program.; the setting up of a military base in Kyrgyzstan which is only some 250 miles from the Chinese border near Lop Nor, China’s nuclear testing ground.
Add to that the announcement of President George W Bush that the US would come to the aid of Taiwan in the event that China uses force against it; the sending of two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters near Taiwan in 1995-1996; and the naval show of strength of seven aircraft carrier battle groups converging off the China coast in August 2004. All these aggressive moves by superpower America pushed China to embrace its former bitter rival, Russia.
Both China and Russia needed a secure and reliable rear; and both are ideally positioned to provide it. Moreover, their strengths ideally complement each other. It must be borne in mind that both are nuclear powers. The abundant energy resources of Russia ensures that China will not run out of gas in a major conflict - a strategic advantage over the US and its key allies.
Russia is also supplying China with many of the modern armaments and military technology it needs to modernize its defense sector. This effectively militates against the arms embargo imposed by the US and the EU on China. Russia in turn needs the increased trade with China, China’s financial clout and assistance, and manufactured goods.
The coming together of China and Russia was one of the most earth-shaking geopolitical events of modern times. Yet hardly anyone noticed the transition from bitter enemity to a solid geopolitical, economic, diplomatic and military alliance. The combined strengths of the two regional powers surely surpass that of the former Warsaw Pact. If we add Iran to the equation, we have a triumvirate that can pose a formidable challenge to the lone superpower. Iran is the most industrialized and the most populous nation in the Middle East. It is second only to Russia in terms of gas resources and also one of the largest oil producers in the world. It is also one of the most mountainous countries in the world, which makes it ideal for the conduct of asymmetric and guerrilla warfare against a superior adversary.
Iran borders both the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, two of the richest oil and gas regions of the world. Most importantly, it controls the gateway to the Persian Gulf - the Strait of Hormuz. Modern bottom-rising, rocket propelled sea mines and supersonic cruise missiles deployed along the long mountainous coastline of Iran, manned by "invisible" guerrillas, could indefinitely stop the flow of oil from the Gulf, from which the US gets 23% of its imported oil.
Japan also derives 90% of its oil from the Persian Gulf area, and Europe about 60%. In a major conflict, Iran can effectively deprive the US war machine and those of its key allies of much needed energy supplies.
Imagine the war machine of the superpower running out of gas. Imagine also a US economy minus 23% of its imported oil. This 23% can rise considerably once Chinese and Russian submarines start sinking US-bound oil tankers. The triumvirate of China, Russia, and Iran could bring the US to its knees with a minimum of movement.
2.) The US's geopolitical disadvantage
Another "acupuncture point" in America’s anatomy in the event of a major conflict with China (and Russia) is its inherent disadvantage dictated by geography. Being the lone superpower, any major conventional conflict involving the US will necessitate its bringing its forces to bear on its adversaries. This means that the US must cross the Pacific, Indian, and/or Atlantic Oceans in order to bring logistics or troop reinforcements to the battlefield.
In so doing, the US will be crossing thousands of miles of sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that can easily become a gauntlet of deadly Chinese and Russian submarines lying in ambush with bottom-rising sea mines, supercavitating rocket torpedoes, and supersonic cruise missiles that even aircraft carrier battle groups have no known defense against. Logistic and transport ships and oil tankers are particularly vulnerable.
The air corridors above these sea lanes will also be put at great risk by advanced air defense systems aboard Sovremenny destroyers or similar types of warships in Chinese and Russian inventories. In short, the US will be forced by geography to suffer all the disadvantages of conducting offensive operations against adversaries in Eurasia.
Of course, the US has "forces in being" and "logistics in place" in numerous military bases scattered around the world, especially those strategically encircling China, Russia, and Iran. But when the shooting war starts, these bases will be the first to be hit by barrages of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and long-range land-attack cruise missiles armed with electro-magnetic pulse, anti-radar, thermobaric, and conventional warheads.
Following the missile barrages, the remnants of such weakened US military bases will easily be overwhelmed by blitzkrieg assaults from Russian and Chinese armored divisions in the Eurasian mainland. China, for instance, has four large armored units constantly on standby, poised to cross the Yili Corridor in Xinjiang province at a moment’s notice. The US base in Kyrgyzstan near the Chinese border would not stand a chance.
China, Russia and/or Iran, on the other hand, will operate on interior lines within the Eurasian mainland. When they move troops and logistics to meet any threat on the continent, they will have relatively secure lines of communication and logistics, using inland highways, railways and air transport.
Since the US cannot correct the dictates of geography, it and its main allies Japan and the UK will have to live and fight with this tremendous geopolitical disadvantage. Of course the US can bypass this geographic obstacle if it attacks China and Russia with its intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers in a nuclear first strike, but China and Russia have the means to retaliate and obliterate the United States and its allies as well.
There are some among the leading neo-conservatives in the US who believe that a nuclear war is winnable; that there is no such thing as mutually assured destruction (MAD). Well, that truly mad way of thinking may well spell the end of planet earth for all of us.
3.) Asymmetric attack
Superpower America is particularly vulnerable to asymmetric attack. A classic example of asymmetric attack is the September 11, 2001, attack on America. Nineteen determined attackers, armed with nothing but box cutters, succeeded in toppling the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and causing the death of some 3,000 Americans. Notice the asymmetry of casualty ratio as well - the most lopsided casualty ratio ever recorded in history.
China, Russia, and Iran also possess asymmetric weapons that are designed to neutralize and defeat a superpower like America in a conventional conflict. Supersonic cruise missiles now in their inventories can defeat and sink US aircraft carriers. The same is true for medium- and short-range ballistic missiles with independently targetable warheads, extra-large bottom-rising, rocket-propelled sea mines (EM52s), and supercavitating rocket torpedoes (SHKVAL or "Squall"). The US Navy has no known defense against these weapons.
Iraqi insurgents are conducting a form of asymmetric warfare. They use improvised explosive devices, car bombs, booby traps and landmines against the most modern army the world has ever seen. The US's huge advantage in weaponry is negated by the fact that its soldiers cannot see their adversary. They are fighting against a "phantom" enemy - an invisible army.
And how can you win against an enemy you cannot see? This may be one reason why reports of massacres of Iraqi civilians by US soldiers have been increasing lately. But turning sophisticated weapons against civilians will never win wars for America. It will only heighten the rage of the victimized population and increase suicide bombings against US forces.
Connected to asymmetric warfare is asynchronous warfare, where the weaker side bides its time to strike back. And it strikes at a time and place where the adversary is totally unprepared.
For example, if the US were to strike Iran’s underground nuclear facilities with bunker-busting tactical nuclear warheads, Iran could bide its time until it develops its own nuclear weapons. It could then use its Kilo class submarines, equipped with supersonic "moskit" cruise missiles armed with Iran’s own nuclear warheads, to hit New York, or Washington, DC as a payback to the US for using nuclear weapons against Iran. Or the Iranians could infiltrate nuclear scientists into the US, where they would fabricate a "dirty" bomb to be detonated near the US Congress, in full session while the president is making his annual state of the nation address.
The possibilities for asymmetric and asynchronous warfare are limitless. Various weapons are available to the asymmetric or asynchronous attacker. If a simple box cutter produced such devastating results on September 11, 2001, imagine what chemical or biological weapons dropped from a private aircraft could do to a crowded city; or trained hackers attacking the US banking system and other key infrastructure and basic services; or man-portable surface-to-air missiles attacking US airlines taking off or landing in various airports around the globe; or non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons hitting New York City or the US Capitol. No amount of even the best intelligence in the world can totally guard against and stop a determined asymmetric attacker.
4.) Attack on US's command and control
C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In a war situation, C4ISR is a prime target because therein lies the center of gravity of one's adversary. Neutralizing C4ISR is like cutting off the head of a chicken. It can run around in circles for a while, but will soon collapse and die. The same is true in warfare.
Having the mightiest and most modern armed forces in the world, America prides itself with having the most sophisticated and advanced C4ISR. US military spy satellites can gather intelligence data and disseminate it on a real time basis. US surveillance and reconnaissance satellites are so sophisticated that their sensors can detect objects on Earth as small as one-tenth of a meter in size, from several hundred miles up. Satellite sensors can also penetrate clouds and bad weather or see in the night. Some of these spy satellites can also monitor radio or telephone conversations.
Aside from communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, satellites are also used for navigation, most especially in guiding ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and other smart weapon systems to their targets. Without satellite guidance, such "smart" and precision weapons turn into "dumb" bombs and directionless missiles.
The advances in C4ISR are rapidly revolutionizing warfare. Gathering, processing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence is now made possible on a real-time or near real-time basis on a global or regional level. Because of these developments, a new war principle is emerging in the modern battlefield: "If the enemy sees you; you are dead."
The US is far advanced in its C4ISR compared with, for instance, China. China cannot hope to catch up and match the American system anytime soon. So in order for China to survive in the event of a major conflict with the US, China has to resort to asymmetric means. This means that China has to develop effective means of countering and neutralizing America’s C4ISR. And that is what China had been working on for more than two decades now.
The heart of America’s C4ISR lies in its technologically sophisticated satellites. But this seeming strength is also an Achilles' heel. Neutralize or destroy the key satellites, and America’s major forces, such as aircraft carrier battle groups, are blinded, muted, and decapitated. This concept is part of China’s strategy for "defeating a superior with an inferior" called shashaojian, or "assassin’s mace". It is like the mace kept by ladies in their bags, which they use when attacked by a mugger or rapist. They squirt the mace into the eyes of an attacker to temporarily blind him, giving the intended victim time to escape.
China now has the capability to identify and track satellites. And for more than two decades they have been busy developing anti-satellite weapons. China has been developing maneuverable nano-satellites that can neutralize other satellites. They do their work by maneuvering near a target satellite and neutralizing the target by electronic jamming, electro-magnetic pulse generation, clinging to the target and physically destroying it, bumping the target out of orbit, or simply exploding to bring the target satellite down with it. Such nano satellites can be launched in batches on demand by road-mobile DF21 or DF31 booster rockets.
Another anti-satellite weapon in the works is a land-based laser that blinds the sensitive sensors of satellites or even destroys them completely. Of course, if worse comes to worst, China can always use its weapon of last resort, destroying adversary satellites with a high-altitude nuclear burst. But this will only be used if China has not yet fully developed the other options when major hostilities start. With the neutralization of its C4ISR, America would be like "a blind man trying to catch fish with his bare hands", to quote Mao Zedong. In short, America would be brought to its knees.
5.) Attack on US aircraft carrier battle groups
Aircraft carrier battle groups are the mainstay of US military supremacy. They serve as America’s chief instrument for global power projection and world dominance. In this category, the US has no equal. At the moment, the US maintains a total of 12 aircraft carrier battle groups. In comparison, China has none.
From June to August 2004, the US, for the first time in its naval history, conducted an exercise involving the simultaneous convergence of seven of its 12 aircraft carrier battle groups to within striking distance of China’s coast. This was the biggest and most massive show of force the world has ever seen. It was to remind China that if it uses force against Taiwan, China will have to contend with this kind of response.
It was mentioned earlier that China’s strategy in defeating the superior by the inferior is shashaojian or the "assassin’s mace". "Mace" is not only a blinding spray; it is also a meaner and deadlier weapon, a spiked war club of ancient times used to knock out an adversary with one blow. The spikes of the modern Chinese mace may well spell the end for aircraft carriers.
The first of these spikes consists of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles (modified and improved DF 21s/CSS-5 and DF 15s) with terminally guided maneuverable re-entry vehicles with circular error probability of 10 meters. DF 21s/CSS-5s can hit slow-moving targets at sea up to 2,500km away.
The second spike is an array of supersonic and highly accurate cruise missiles, some with range of 300km or more, that can be delivered by submarines, aircraft, surface ships or even common trucks (which are ideal for use in terrain like that of Iran along the Persian Gulf). These supersonic cruise missiles travel at more than twice the speed of sound (mach 2.5), or faster than a rifle bullet. They can be armed with conventional, anti-radiation, thermobaric, or electro-magnetic pulse warheads, or even nuclear warheads if need be. The Aegis missile defense system and the Phalanx Close-in Defense weapons of the US Navy are ineffective against these supersonic cruise missiles.
A barrage of these cruise missiles, followed by land-based intermediate- or short-range ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems, could wreak havoc on an aircraft carrier battle group. Whether there are seven or 15 carrier battle groups, it will not matter, for China has enough ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy them all. Unfortunately for the US and British navies, they do not have the capacity to counter a barrage of supersonic cruise missile followed by a second barrage of ballistic missiles.
The first and second spikes of the "assassin’s mace" are sufficient to render the aircraft carrier battle groups obsolete. But there is a third spike which is equally dreadful. This is the deadly SHKVAL or "Squall" rocket torpedo developed by Russia and passed on to China. It is like an under-water missile. It weighs 6,000lbs and travels at 200 knots or 230mph, with a range of 7,500 yards. It is guided by autopilot and with its high speed, makes evasive maneuvers by carriers or nuclear submarines highly difficult. It is truly a submarine and carrier buster; and again, the US and its allies have no known defense against such a supercavitating rocket torpedo.
The "assassin’s mace" has still more spikes. The fourth spike consists of extra-large, bottom-rising, rocket-propelled sea mines laid by submarines along the projected paths of advancing carrier battle groups. These sea mines are designed specifically for targeting aircraft carriers. They can be grouped in clusters so that they will hit the carriers in barrages.
The final spike of the mace is a fleet of old fighter aircraft (China has thousands of them) modified as unmanned combat aerial vehicles fitted with extra fuel tanks and armed with stand-off anti-ship missiles. They are also packed with high explosives so that after firing off their precision-guided anti-ship missiles on the battle group, they will then finish their mission by dive-bombing "kamikaze" style into their targets.
If we now combine the mace as a means of blinding an adversary and the mace as a spiked war club, one can see the complete picture of how China will use the "assassin’s mace" to send America’s aircraft carrier battle groups into the dustbin of naval history. Although China does not possess a single operational aircraft carrier, it has converted the entire China mainland into a "virtual aircraft carrier" that is unsinkable and capable of destroying all the aircraft carrier battle groups that the US and its allies can muster.
The sad part for the US Navy is that even if American leaders and naval theorists realize the horrible truth that aircraft carriers have been rendered obsolete in modern warfare by China’s "assassin’s mace", the navy cannot just change strategy or discard its carriers. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been poured into those weapon systems and hundreds of thousands of jobs would be affected if such behemoths are turned into scrap. Besides, even if US Navy authorities wanted to change strategy, the all-powerful and influential military-industrial complex lobby would not allow it.
So, if and when a major conflict between the US and China occurs, say over the issue of Taiwan, pity those thousands of American sailors who are unfortunate enough to be in one of those aircraft carrier battle groups. They won't stand a chance.
A challenge to America
The 10 "acupuncture points" mentioned in this article (See also Part 1: Striking the US where it hurts) are like a 10-stage riddle. It is an "assassin's mace" or war club of olden times with 10 deadly spikes. Any one of those spikes can bring America to its knees. I therefore throw this riddle to the think tanks in the Pentagon, to the US Congress, to the president's men, to US academe, and to every concerned American.
America is in the last two minutes of the fourth quarter of the "great game", and it is behind in points. If America can solve the riddle in time, it wins the game, it can seize global leadership, and the 21st century will truly be the American Century.
On the other hand, failure to solve the riddle will shake America to its very foundation and cause this great nation to collapse - just like that vivid image of the collapsing Twin Towers familiar to each and every American. America loses, and it will be down and out for the rest of this century.
Wake up, America!
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